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1 Introduction 
The 2 December 2001 the United Arab Emirates (UAE) celebrated 30 years as a 
federation. Few dared to predict that the federation would be such a success. At the 
beginning of the new century, the federation “faces no immediate threat of 
invasion, overwhelming debt, organised domestic opposition or economic collapse” 
(Foley 1999:1). This, even though the Gulf region has had to cope with the most 
tremendous changes, due to the sudden influx of oil. It has witnessed the fastest 
population growth, the most rapid urbanisation and some of the largest flows of 
immigration in the world.1 In 30 years, the UAE has gone from being seven 
inward-looking, poor sheikhdoms, to becoming a federation of modern oil-rich 
emirates.  
 
Modernisation theory predicts that countries with a rapid economic development 
will experience a move towards democratic institutions, like political representation 
(Lipset 1959). Such a rapid economic development has not led to the introduction 
of democratic institutions or to the mobilisation of a political opposition against the 
regime in the UAE. The economic and political development we have witnessed in 
the Arab Gulf monarchies,2 however, deviates from the predictions of the 
modernisation theory, because the modernisation theory does not cover the rentier 
phenomenon.3 The purpose of this thesis is not to discuss the validity of the 
modernisation theory, but rather to pursue the rentier phenomenon as a distinctive 
explanation of the political development of the UAE.  
 
This leads us to the core question of this thesis: In what way does the government 
use the oil economy as an instrument in securing political stability in the UAE? 
                                              
1 The Economist 23.03.02. 
 
2 Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE. In this thesis also referred to as: the Gulf states 
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1.1 Approaching a State like the United Arab Emirates 
Max Weber’s concept of authority has been essential in discussing legitimacy in the 
Arab World. Weber (1990:91-104) distinguishes between three ‘pure’ kinds of 
legitimate authority: legal, traditional and charismatic authority. The former of the 
three types, legal authority, is built on laws, where the purest form is the 
bureaucratic authority. The norm is that through a formally correct legislation any 
law can be created or abolished. The ruler shall not be obeyed because of his 
personal qualities, but rather because of the legal rule that he commands. The 
modern state fits best that of the legal structure. The second type of authority, 
traditional authority, is the belief that past structures of authority are considered to 
be holy. The purest form is the patriarchal structure. When the ruler is obeyed, it is 
because the tradition makes him worth obeying. A patrimonial authority is a 
subspecies of patriarchal authority. The patrimonial state has fairly advanced staff 
and administrative units, but it is still tied to the person of the absolute ruler and to 
the realm of prerogative and favouritism surrounding him (Ayubi 1995:164). The 
last kind, charismatic authority, can be described as an authority where the people 
feel an emotional devotion to the leader because of his charisma. It is his 
personality that makes him worth obeying.  
 
In his book on Arab Politics (1977), Michael Hudson draws heavily on the work of 
Weber and David Easton (1967), who is also strongly influenced by Weber, and has 
provided a classification of legitimacy resources, close to that of Weber. Hudson 
sees the legitimacy problems in the Middle East in light of the modernising process. 
The basis of legitimacy is changing, as the states are turning into modern nation-
states. Patrimonial authority, and to a certain degree charismatic authority, has been 
the basis of authority in the Gulf. The Gulf states are all hereditary and patriarchal, 
and to a varying degree conservative (Ayubi 1995:231). Political stability in this 
region has often been attributed to the continuance of the traditional way of ruling. 
                                                                                                                                        
3 Defined as the dependence on one commodity, often referred to as ‘the gift of nature’. In this case, I am referring to oil 
rent. 
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All the Gulf countries are ruled by a tribal leadership. Hudson stresses the 
importance of kinship groups in the Arab society, and the role of the father in the 
Arab family. The tribe, and today even more the family plays an important political 
as well as a social role in society. It has been a tradition that the most powerful or 
the “best” families ruled the area, and that one of the senior members is the leader, 
often called ‘sheikh’. Although this does not happen automatically, “patrimonial 
respect is the rule” (Hudson 1977:85).  
 
Theories concerning authority structures and legitimacy resources appeared before 
one could see the effects of the oil boom in the Gulf. Michael Herb (1999) stresses 
in his book; “All in the Family. Absolutism, revolution, and democracy in the 
Middle Eastern Monarchies”, that the best explanation of the survival of the Gulf 
monarchies, can still be found in the nature of their regime. More specifically he is 
referring to the role of the ruling families in these regimes. The rise of these family 
regimes, which he calls dynastic monarchies,4 has had great political consequences. 
He states that no regime of this kind has ever fallen to revolution. The rise of these 
family regimes is closely connected to the oil revenues. Dynastic monarchies only 
exist in states with plenty of oil. However, according to Michael Herb, the UAE, 
along with the other Gulf monarchies, are stable because they are dynastic 
monarchies, and not because of the oil wealth itself: “The qualification on the use 
of the money, and not simply its existence, is crucial. The key variable is not the 
mere presence of oil wealth but instead how political actors, in the context of 
existing political institutions, respond to the influx of oil revenues” (Herb 1999:11). 
Some of Herbs points will be exemplified later in this thesis. 
 
Since the late 1980s the rentier model has been one of the dominant theories on the 
political stability of the Gulf monarchies. Academics like Hazem Beblawi 
(1987,1990), Giacomo Luciani (1987, 1990), Jill Crystal (1990), Gregory Gause 
(1994), Øystein Noreng (1997) and Nazih Ayubi (1995) have all shown interest in 
                                              
4 The ruling family is the Government – a family-ruled regime. 
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the rentier state. This model attributes the political stability of the Gulf monarchies 
to the political economy created by oil revenues. There exists a social contract 
between the ruled and the rulers. The rulers offer the ruled economic welfare in 
exchange for political support. In this way the government is able to buy off any 
political opposition that may arise, and the social contract becomes a political 
strategy to maintain political power.  
 
The rapid development in the UAE as a result of the heavy influx of oil would not 
have been possible without the availability of foreign labour. Accordingly, 
immigration flows have had a massive impact on the composition of the UAE 
population. Today, only 20% of the total population are UAE nationals.5 Several 
scholars have taken interest in these unique population patterns: J. S Birks and C.A 
Sinclair (1980), Birks, Seccombe and Pridham (1988), Ang Nga Longva (1993), 
Michael E. Bonine (1997), Sulayman al-Qudsi (1998), Onn Winckler (2000) and 
Andrzej Kapiszewski (2001). The predominance of non-nationals6 in the UAE 
labour market is an effect of the government’s economic welfare policy towards 
nationals. Hence, it is an important element in the oil rentier state. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                        
 
5 A UAE National is equivalent to a UAE citizen. In the following I will also use the terms; an Emirati or a Local. 
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1.2 The Scope of the Thesis 
1.2.1 The Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of this thesis is the rentier theory. Examining all the 
above-mentioned perspectives would be too ambitious within the limits of this 
thesis. The rentier model has been the dominant perspective throughout the last 
decade. Unfortunately, I have still not seen an in-depth analysis of the UAE as a 
rentier state. The fact that the rentier theory has been criticised for its rather 
simplistic nature (Herb 1999), makes it interesting to examine. In addition, the 
methodological problems connected to analysing the influence of traditional and 
charismatic leadership in an authoritarian state are so severe, that it can be hard to 
draw conclusions. 
 
This thesis considers the problems related to an oil-based economy. However, the 
way the ruling family handles these problems is relevant for the loyalty of the 
citizens. Gary Sick (1997:16-21) has listed seven ‘structural distortions’ of an oil 
rentier state, which has some troubling long-term consequences: 1. Budgetary 
Uncertainties, due to fluctuating oil prices. 2. Dominance of the Public Sector. The 
state owns the important means of production. 3. Dominance of Foreign Labour. 4. 
Unemployment. “One of the most intractable and politically dangerous problems in 
the Persian Gulf in the 1990s” (Sick 1997:19). 5. Inadequate Revenues. A social 
welfare network among the most generous in the world, and at the same time 
encouraging population growth. 6. Absence of Popular Participation. The 
government ‘buys off’ any political opposition that may arise. 7. Lack of 
Accountability. The absolute control of state finances by the ruling families permits 
no systematic accountability. 
 
These ‘structural distortions’ will be the essence of the hypotheses discussed in this 
thesis. 
                                                                                                                                        
6 A Non-national is not entitled to obtain a UAE citizenship. In the following I will also use the term; an Expatriate. 
 6
 
1.2.2 The Case  
Two times during the last decade, world attention has been drawn to the Persian 
Gulf7: The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait 2nd August 1990 and the terrorist attack in the 
USA 11 September 2001, where most of the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia, 
and one or two were from the United Arab Emirates. It was especially after the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, that the small monarchies of the Gulf caught the 
interest of western academics. The UAE seems, however, to attract little interest. 
There are three main reasons as to why I have chosen this state and not one of the 
other Gulf states. The first one is connected to the unique structure of the UAE, the 
second is related to the political climate, and the third is personally motivated.  
 
The UAE differs from the other Gulf states, and in fact from all of the states in the 
Middle East, on one important factor: The UAE is a federation. It is the only federal 
project that has ever succeeded in the Arab world. Studies of the UAE, especially in 
comparison with other states, leave out this factor. I consider this to be a weakness 
in the academic literature.  
 
The political climate is also unique, compared to the other Gulf states with a similar 
economy. The UAE is not experiencing any political opposition or demands for 
political representation.8 This reflects the interest of academics. Conflict is more 
appealing than stability. It is generally believed that Kuwait and Saudi Arabia are 
the most studied of all the Arab Gulf monarchies.   
 
                                              
7 The countries of the Persian Gulf include: Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the UAE. 
 
8 While Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar all have witnessed various degrees of political opposition, demands for 
political reforms, and even political representation, the UAE is the exception among the Arab Gulf Monarchies, with no 
signs of political discontent. 
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The third and final reason behind my choice of case is personal. I spent four of my 
childhood years in the Emirate of Dubai. This experience has been the basis of my 
interest in the Arabic language, culture and traditions. 
1.3 The Research Model 
There are problems related to the study of a federation that will have an effect on 
the research model. The United Arab Emirates consists of seven emirates,9 where 
much of the political power lies in the hands of the ruling families in each 
individual emirate, or as Herb (1999:135) so rightly stresses; “… the UAE is very 
much a confederation: power lies not at the federal level but instead in the ruling 
families of the larger emirates…” To only study the country as a whole leaves out 
important factors in understanding the political stability of the UAE. In a way, there 
are seven countries in one country. In addition, the federal level (the relationship 
between the ruling families of the individual emirates) must be taken into 
consideration, to be able to identify the different layers of rentiers.  
 
The independent variable in this thesis is oil rent, while the intervening variables 
are welfare policies and political loyalty. These variables will, as a consequence of 
the UAE’s structure, be discussed on two levels: the state-citizen level (the 
relationship between the rulers of the UAE and the UAE citizens), and the federal 
level. The dependent variable, political stability, is however the same in both 
analyses. It is the stability of the UAE as a whole that is the focus of this thesis. 
 
The time limit, i.e. the period where political stability is studied, is from the 
formation of the federation in 1971 and up until today. Although the oil discovery 
in Abu Dhabi came prior to this year, it was after the oil boom in 1973/74 that one 
could start to see the effects of the oil revenues. 
 
                                              
9 Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. 
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1.3.1 The Independent Variable 
My independent variable is oil rent. “To ‘explain’ a phenomenon is to stipulate a 
set of causal links about it” (Yin 1994:110). The independent variable is believed to 
‘explain’ a phenomenon, i.e. the dependent variable. According to the rentier 
theory, there is a link between oil and political stability. The operational definition 
of oil rent can be production of barrels a day, oil prises or oil revenues. The latter 
definition is the natural measurement in this case. The oil rent does not, however, 
have an effect on the political stability in itself. It is the way the rulers use the oil 
rent that is crucial. The oil rent is the variable that is presumed to have an effect on 
the state’s economic welfare policy.   
 
Here, the two levels come into effect, because the federation owns no oil. The 
natural resources are the property of each individual emirate. On the federal level, 
the wealthiest emirate, Abu Dhabi, is the major receiver of the oil rent, and 
becomes in this way, according to the rentier theory, the ruler on the federal level. 
On the state-citizen level, the oil revenues are distributed through the federal 
budget, and through the local government in the emirates with oil rent. 
   
1.3.2 The Intervening Variables 
I have labelled my first intervening variable ‘welfare policies’. In a rentier state, the 
government plays a large role in distributing wealth to the population, without 
imposing income tax. This is a consequence of the enormous influx of oil revenues. 
 
On the state-citizen level the ruler is the government, or more correctly; the ruling 
family (ies) is the ruler, and the ruled are the UAE citizens. The ruler’s welfare 
policies are therefore thought to have an effect on the citizens’ loyalty to the 
regime. I consider welfare policies as giving the citizens access to primary goods, 
education, health services, employment, feelings of security etc. This can be 
measured by studying state expenditure on welfare goods and pro-natalist policies 
in the labour market. If the state expenditure on welfare goods declines, or if the 
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unemployment rate increases, this is bound to have an effect on the relationship 
between the rulers and the ruled. 
On the federal level, I argue that the ruling family in Abu Dhabi is the ruler and the 
ruling families of the smaller emirates are the ruled. In this case, Abu Dhabi’s 
subsidies of the smaller emirates are presumed to correlate with the ruling families’ 
loyalty to the ruling family in Abu Dhabi.  
 
The second intervening variable is political loyalty. Political loyalty expresses the 
popular support of the regime. The operational definition is therefore considered to 
be the level of organised political opposition. Since political loyalty is presumed to 
be economically motivated, the economic welfare of the citizens will positively 
correlate with political loyalty. Herb (1999:243) does not agree with this definition. 
He claims that, “The level of expressed opposition is not a reliable measure of 
actual sentiment about a regime, for the expression of opposition depends very 
much on the expected reaction of the regime itself (...) In fact there is no strong 
correlation between opposition and revolution.” Herb has a point, but in his 
analysis, the focus is the rise and fall of monarchies in the Middle East. The rentier 
theory, on the other hand, only predicts that the government is able to buy off any 
political opposition that might arise, and not that the regimes will be resilient. 
Accordingly, the level of expressed opposition can be considered to be a measure 
of political loyalty. 
 
On the state-citizen level I identify political loyalty as the level of organised 
domestic political opposition among the citizens, which could threaten the stability 
of the regime in the UAE. On the federal level, however, political loyalty is 
identified as the level of political opposition among the ruling families of the 
individual emirates, against the ruling family in Abu Dhabi.  
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1.3.3 The Dependent Variable 
Political stability can be defined in various ways. In this thesis I choose to define 
political stability as the degree of change in the political regime, i.e. a continuance 
of the existing regime. A political regime refers to the organisation of political 
power in a state. The regime tells us how the decision-making process is organised, 
in addition to the organisation of political roles (Østerud 1991:125). 
 
The UAE can be described as a dynastic monarchy. The political power is 
organised around the ruling families of each individual emirate. According to my 
definition, the continuance of this political role is considered to be an element in the 
political stability of the UAE. The continuance of the organisation of decision-
making as described in the Federal Constitution of 2 December 1971 is the second 
element in the political stability of the UAE. 
 
 
The following model is extracted:                                                                  
 
 
Political 
Stability 
Political
Loyalty
Welfare 
Policies
Oil  
Rent  
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1.4 Methodological Considerations 
1.4.1 The Single Case Study 
In this study, I use the basic principles of the case study. The case study is used 
whenever “a ”how” or ”why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of 
events over which the investigator has little or no control” (Yin 1994:9). 
 
The case study has been criticised for being a “weak sibling among social science 
methods” (Yin 1994:xiii), and is less desirable than experiments and surveys (Ibid 
1994:10). Yin argues, however, that analytical generalisation is possible in the 
matter of a single case study (Ibid 1994:31). If a case study’s empirical data 
supports theoretical propositions, this theory’s propositions are strengthened. My 
aim in this thesis is, however, not to test theory, i.e. to draw conclusions concerning 
the validity of the rentier model, but rather use theoretical propositions as a 
theoretical orientation guiding the case study analysis (Ibid 1994:104). I perform 
what Andersen (1997:68) calls theoretical interpretative case studies. In an 
interpretative case study, which is one of three categories of case studies that 
Andersen mentions, one uses theoretical assumptions to explore how various 
factors influence a certain phenomenon. Some studies do not seek to generalise 
findings, in order to develop a theory, but rather uses theoretical assumptions to 
organise the empirical material.  My aim in this thesis is, in accordance with this, to 
use the rentier theory to examine how the rulers use the oil economy as an 
instrument in securing political stability in the UAE.  
 
As I have mentioned above, this thesis aims at examining the political stability of 
the UAE, by studying the relationship between the ruling families and the UAE 
citizens, and the relationship between the ruling families of the individual emirates. 
Hence, it is the idea of a social contract existing on two levels. Andersen (1997:70) 
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claims that an important challenge is to show theoretical inventiveness. The 
scientist’s interest increases when established theory is applied to new areas. In this 
thesis, I have applied the rentier theory to a new level, i.e. the federal level. 
  
1.4.2 The Sources 
“The case-study’s unique strength is its ability to deal with a full variety of 
evidence- documents, artefacts, interviews and observation” (Yin 1994:8). Ottar 
Hellevik (1991:103) states, however, that a researcher has to view his/her data in 
light of the data’s validity (relevance) and reliability (trustworthiness). When the 
researcher collects his/her own data, the possibility of influencing the phenomenon 
is always an issue. However, the data’s relevance and trustworthiness can be at risk 
when the data is not collected by the researcher him/herself. The data will usually 
be collected for other purposes.  
 
My study is performed with the use of both primary and secondary data. I have 
conducted two study trips, and collected my own data, while I at the same time had 
to rely on secondary data, both to complement my findings and to increase the 
validity and reliability of my data. 
 
Lack of Literature 
This research would not have been possible to conduct with the use of books and 
articles alone. There is so little available literature on the United Arab Emirates that 
conclusions would be difficult to draw. The use of literature concerning all the Gulf 
states has therefore been necessary. This raises some problems. There is a common 
thought that the Gulf monarchies are so similar. They have a common religion, 
Islam, a common language, Arabic, a common heritage and tribal background, and 
a common political system, monarchy. In addition, there is a geographical 
proximity, a relatively equal standard of living, oil-based economies, and apart 
from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf monarchies are physically, militarily and 
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psychologically small states (Abdulla 1999:161). However, the importance of Islam 
in state politics differ, the degree of openness in state politics and economy differ, 
the use of the oil revenues and the amount of oil revenues differ, and the size and 
the composition of the population differ. These are important factors when 
analysing the degree of political opposition, and might explain why some Gulf 
monarchies are witnessing an increasing discontent with the government. However, 
being aware of the similarities and differences between the Gulf states, the use of 
these books can only be a fruitful contribution to this study. Whenever an author 
refers to the Gulf states, I will refer to the Gulf states as well, and not the UAE. 
 
Lack of Openness 
My two field trips were both conducted in the United Arab Emirates, in the periods: 
26 March – 5 May 2001 and 20 April – 26 April 2002. The intention was to only 
conduct one field trip. However, as the thesis took form, the missing gaps became 
clearer. 
 
During my stays I performed a series of informal interviews10 and observations, in 
addition to the collection of secondary data. Whenever information from the 
interviews and observations are used as the only source of information, this is 
explicitly underlined. Elsewhere, the information is only used together with other 
sources of information. This increases the reliability of the information concerned. 
However, to study an authoritarian country, like the UAE, without ‘getting behind’ 
the public figures, would have been a poor study. Figures concerning the economy 
of the UAE have been particularly difficult to obtain, and when most of the figures 
finally were collected, it turned out that the figures were not very reliable. This is a 
problem that will be discussed throughout the thesis.  
 
                                              
10 According to Hellevik (1991:106), an informal interview is an interview where the questions asked do not follow a 
clear pattern from one interview-situation to another. 
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The informal interviews that I conducted, were partly with full openness from my 
side, and partly not. Not surprisingly, talking freely with other academics was much 
more comfortable than with employees in the various ministries. The UAE is 
experiencing increased pressure from the international community, especially 
concerning the conditions of the non-nationals residing in the country. Hence the 
issue of nationals vs. non-nationals was a highly sensitive subject. The partial 
openness from my side gave me an opportunity to observe some of these ‘patterns’. 
In addition, I hope that I got mostly ‘right’ answers and not ‘politically correct’ 
answers. My guarantee that all interview objects will be anonymous when referred 
to in the text should further strengthen the reliability of the information concerned. I 
am, however, fully aware of the dangers of collecting information on the basis of 
observation and interviews, especially in a country where freedom of speech is not 
common. These sources have therefore only been complementary. 
 
Most of the secondary data that I examined was collected at the Emirates Centre for 
Strategic Studies and Research, one of the most respected research institutes in the 
Gulf. The centre was so kind as to send me their entire collection of publications. 
Their published lectures, their occasional papers and books have all been of great 
value to my study.  
 
Unreliable Statistics 
There is a wide use of statistics in this thesis. Writing a thesis on the political 
economy and demographics of a state requires a wide use of figures. The statistics 
used in this thesis are UAE public statistics, mainly collected at the UAE Central 
Bank and the Ministry of Planning, as well as statistics from international 
organisations, such as the IMF and OPEC. I have also had to rely on statistics used 
by other authors. There are unfortunately considerable problems of reliability 
related to my data. All the statistics are mainly derived from the same sources. 
Figures concerning the economy (oil revenues, budgets, foreign investments and 
external debt) and the composition of the population (and the workforce) all derive 
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from UAE public institutions, even if IMF or OPEC collects them. The most 
serious problem concerns the close ties between the government and the ruling 
family. The emirate owns the oil, however, the ruling families acquire some of the 
oil revenues before they go into the emirate budget. Whenever there is a budget 
deficit, which is not unfamiliar in some of the emirates in the UAE, the ruling 
families cover it. The other problem is related to the sensitivity surrounding matters 
concerning nationals vs. non-nationals. Due to international pressure, these figures 
are not public anymore. Luckily, authors writing on the same issue have been able 
to obtain some statistics. 
 
Throughout the thesis the currency referred to is United States Dollars (US$). Most 
of the figures were originally in Arab Emirates Dirhams (AED). For the reader, 
however, the use of US$ makes it less complicated to compare the figures from the 
UAE with other figures, and at the same time be familiar with the numbers. I 
consequently use the rate at that time. The rate has, however, been fairly stable at    
1 US$ = 3,6710 AED.11 
 
Freedom of Speech 
Besides the above-mentioned sources, newspapers and the Internet have been 
useful tools. Gulf News is a Dubai-based newspaper in English, which has provided 
me with some facts and figures. Since freedom of press is not common in the UAE, 
all information from this source is not likely to be very reliable. I have, however, 
had no choice but to use some information from this newspaper for my empirical 
examples. Usually, I have been able to get a picture of their reliability through other 
sources of information. The same is valid for the Internet. In addition, the 
Economist Intelligence Unit publishes country reports, which are quite detailed, 
and presents empirical findings rather critically. 
 
                                              
11 For annual exchange rates see Appendix 1.0. 
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Analytical Consequences 
As many of my sources are not very reliable, the empirical data causes serious 
implications for the study of the United Arab Emirates. However, with the use of 
various sources, as I have conducted in this thesis, the reliability is likely to 
increase, in addition to the validity. Being critical towards the sources used further 
strengthens the study. 
 
However, on the basis of the empirical data in this thesis, I will not be able to 
falsify nor verify any of the hypotheses presented. My ambition can only be to 
make qualified assessments that could either strengthen or weaken them.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
12 I am indebted to Stig Stenslie for this way of phrasing the ambition in this context. See Stenslie’s thesis; “Oil and 
Politics in Saudi Arabia- A Critical Discussion of the Rentier State Theory” (2001)  
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1.5 Organising the Thesis 
The first part of this thesis, chapter 2, gives an introduction/background to the study 
of the UAE. Initially, a short historical overview will be given, which is necessary 
to understand the political organisation of the UAE, presented in the second part of 
the chapter.  
 
Chapter 3 of this thesis covers the theoretical framework. The rentier theory is the 
core of this study. Based on the theoretical assumptions of the rentier theory, three 
hypotheses will be presented.   
 
Chapter 4 gives the empirical basis for the analyses. The chapter focuses on the oil 
dimension in the UAE. Specific features of the UAE, such as its federal character 
and its unique population structure will be presented. 
 
The final part of this thesis (chapters 5, 6 and 7) includes three analyses, based on 
the three hypotheses presented in chapter 3. The rentier theory predicts that political 
loyalty is economically motivated. How to study this in a federation, where political 
loyalty is related to two levels? This question leads to some frustration. I see the 
relationship between the ruling families of the individual emirates in the federation, 
as being of great importance to the political stability of the country, and therefore 
choose to analyse political loyalty on two levels. The first analysis is connected to 
the presence of a social contract between the citizens and the rulers, while foreign 
labour, as an element in the social contract between the citizens and the rulers, will 
be essential in the second. The third analysis is related to the social contract 
between the ruling family of Abu Dhabi, and the ruling families of the smaller 
emirates. My task is not to empirically test the validity of the rentier theory, but to 
use the rentier theory to illustrate the problem of this thesis: In what way does the 
government use the oil economy as an instrument in securing political stability in 
the United Arab Emirates? 
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2 Rapid Modernisation and Political Stability 
 
Seven sheikhdoms with a long history of rivalry are today united into one state. 
Each sheikhdom or emirate is ruled by a leading family. The questions that arise 
are: What unites these seven emirates? Further: How did the dominant families 
obtain their role in the modern bureaucratic structure of today’s UAE? The 
uniqueness of the Gulf states is the role of the ruling families in government. The 
line between the government and the ruling family (ies) is so difficult to draw that 
analysing the political economy of the UAE is impossible without taking this into 
account. 
 
The first part of this chapter gives a short historical overview concerning the factors 
that contributed to the formation of the UAE federation. Three factors are 
underlined: Britain’s withdrawal from the Gulf, the discovery of oil and the ruling 
families in the area. The second part of this chapter covers the first steps towards a 
federation, the process of institution-making and the provisional constitution, later 
to become permanent, the formalisation of tribal and family lines, political 
opposition and UAE citizenship. This part has been labelled ‘political 
organisation’, and presents the changes/lack of changes in the organisation of 
political power in the federation since its foundation in 1971. Hence, the degree of 
political stability.   
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2.1 Historical Overview 
2.1.1 British Influence in the Gulf 
More than one European power has been involved in the Gulf region during the last 
centuries. With its strategic location on the route to India, “the Gulf became 
inextricably linked with the commercial and political rivalries of western countries: 
Portugal first, then Holland and France, and finally Britain” (Zahlan 1989:4). 
Holland dominated the Gulf during the sixteenth century, while the Dutch, the 
French and the English became involved during the seventeenth century. Britain’s 
intrusion in the region, however, became the most pervasive of the imperialist 
states. To protect the Southern and Western approaches to its lifeline to India, the 
government of India secured for Britain a privileged position all along the coasts of 
Arabia (Hudson 1977:110). Rosemarie Said Zahlan points to two major events that 
have had a lasting influence on the Gulf states. The first was the growth of British 
interests in the Gulf. The second was the rise of the Wahhabi movement on the 
Arabian Peninsula, a religious reform movement in which the basic ideology was a 
return to the original principles of Islam. The movement and the Al Saud family 
went into an alliance, which became the basic element of the kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia today. The Wahhabi-Saudi movement together with British interests in the 
Gulf thus provided the framework for the modern Gulf region (Zahlan 1989:6).  
 
Throughout the eighteenth century the British was threatened by pirates of the 
Qawasim tribe, which was situated in Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. In 1820, 
however, a British naval expedition destroyed their entire fleet, which led to 
separate agreements between the British government and the Qawasim and the 
sheikhs of Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Bahrain. The treaties, 
which were all known as the General Treaty of Peace, prohibited piracy on land and 
at sea (Hudson 1977:110; Zahlan 1989:7). This agreement began to change the 
relationship between the local tribes as well as with the British. Through making a 
truce with the British government, they had also made a truce with each other. 
There was an expectation among the rulers that the British patrolled the Gulf in 
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order to prevent violation of the Treaty. This gave the British authorities a position 
from which they could influence the politics in the region if they so wished (Heard-
Bey 1996:286).  
 
The sheikhs of the lower Gulf states had now entered into treaty relations with 
Britain, and as a result of this, become separate political units, though the limits of 
their authority did not become an issue before the discovery of oil over 100 years 
later (Zahlan 1989:8). However, the acts of piracy did not stop, especially not 
towards the other tribes in the region. A new truce was signed in 1835, and a 
permanent one from 1853. The states who signed the latter truce, the Perpetual 
Maritime Truce, became known as the Trucial States.13 This name persisted until 
1971, when the British withdrew from the Gulf, and these states formed the United 
Arab Emirates.  
 
Britain has had an important impact on the formation of the Gulf states. The treaties 
gave the rulers continuity and political status, and treated them as separate political 
units. The treaties also secured British dominance in the Gulf, which in a way 
sealed the Gulf states off from the rest of the World. The British even handled their 
foreign relations on their behalf. This isolation caused the states to become 
parochial and inward-looking. It was a place where time had stood still (Zahlan 
1989:13). The continuaty of Arab tribal customs was in this way protected. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
13 Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. 
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2.1.2 The Discovery of Oil 
”The entry of the oil companies in search of concessions soon after World War I 
was to become a major milestone in the socio-political and economic evolution of 
the region” (Zahlan 1989:16).  
 
The presence of oil companies in the Gulf had an influence on two different areas: 
They upheld and perpetuated the political units, which had evolved and developed 
under the British, and they acted as agents of major change (Zahlan 1989:16).  
Since the concessions were placed in the names of the different rulers, the oil 
companies helped to maintain the political system. However, a new problem arose. 
The precise delineation of each state’s boundaries had never been discussed. Tribal 
politics had been more concerned with authority over people than over territory 
with boundaries (Heard-Bey 1996:56). Now, every state wanted the largest possible 
area. This led to various tensions between the neighbouring states. Some of these 
territory disputes are still going on today. 
 
Oil, in commercial quantities, was first discovered in Bahrain in 1932. In today’s 
United Arab Emirates oil was not found in large quantities until 1960, in the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi (Heard-Bey 1996:307). Dubai struck oil in 1966. Oil wealth 
gave Abu Dhabi a lead in the economic development over the other emirates. 
 
One of the most striking changes with the discovery of oil and the entry of the oil 
companies was the opening up of the region to the outside world. The United States 
interests in the Gulf began to grow, and American oil companies were, beside the 
British, the first to buy concessions in the region. After a while American oil 
companies became firmly established in the Gulf. “…Their interests ultimately 
providing the basis for a forward US policy in the Arab world. A new power was 
set to overtake Britain” (Zahlan 1989:19).  
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2.1.3 The Tribal Structure of Society 
If we go back in history, southeastern Arabia witnessed several migrations from the 
West and the North, with the result that the population in the area mostly are of 
Arab stock. Over 2000 years ago the desert and the coast were under nobody’s rule, 
but that of nomadic communities. From the second century AD, groups or tribes 
first occupied areas. Frauke Heard-Bey argues that the survival of the tribal 
structure on the Arabian Peninsula has to be seen in relation with the need for 
economic diversification, due to the geography and the climate of the country 
(Heard-Bey 1996:24). On the one side you had agriculture, camel breeding, goat 
breeding and so on, and on the other side there was trading, pearling and fishing. 
 
Two tribal groups have dominated the area, which today is the United Arab 
Emirates. The Qawasim, which I have mentioned earlier, was a clan, who had 
imposed its authority over a number of tribes. The word “Qawasim” was often 
applied by the British to all Arabs living on the shores of the Gulf (Heard-Bey 
1996:68). From 1850 the Qawasim sheikhs ruled along the coast and in the 
mountains north of Sharjah. The most important source of income was the pearling 
industry, that is, until the Wall Street crash in 1929. After this incident, the pearl 
market decreased, and the cultured pearls from Japan became more desirable. 
 
The other important tribal group is the Bani Yas. Both the Emirate of Abu Dhabi 
and the Emirate of Dubai are led by sheikhs from various sections of the Bani Yas. 
A member of the al-Nahyan (family) has traditionally been the ruler of Abu Dhabi, 
while the Maktoum family has ruled Dubai since 1833. The Nahyans were mostly 
involved with pearling during the summer, and their date gardens out in the desert, 
during the winter, while the Maktoums were mostly involved in fishing (Heard-Bey 
1996:32). Other sections of the Bani Yas were Bedouins. It was this tribal 
confederation that was the basis for the creation of a nation-state. 
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2.2 Political Organisation 
2.2.1 The Founding of a Federation 
In 1968 the British announced that it would withdraw from the Gulf. Its somewhat 
special protective relationship with the nine sheikhdoms would end in the year of 
1971 (Hudson 1977:196). The British decision to leave the Gulf came as a surprise 
to the rulers and the people of the seven Trucial States, Qatar and Bahrain. They 
were not prepared to face the unresolved territorial claims, to defend the growing 
oil wealth, to deal with the ideological trends sweeping the Arab world, or to guard 
against the possibility of subversion (Heard-Bey 1999:129).  
 
To be able to meet the new reality, and to reduce their vulnerability, the British 
announcement set in motion efforts to unite the small Gulf states into one state. The 
rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai took the first step towards a federation. They met on 
the border between their two emirates 18 February 1968 and resolved their frontier 
difficulties and declared their two states united (Heard-Bey 1999:130). They had, 
however, no intention to stop there. They invited other rulers to join their Union. 
The result was an agreement to establish a federation of the Trucial States, and 
Bahrain and Qatar. The process of institution making, however, was not an easy 
task. The differences between the states were striking. The sheikhdoms were 
unequal in terms of population structure, size of territory, and were diverging when 
it came to wealth and development projects. Bahrain and Qatar were especially far 
ahead in terms of education and institution building. In the summer of 1971 it 
became clear that Bahrain would not join the Union, and 14 August 1971 Bahrain 
declared its independence. The 1 September 1971 Qatar followed (Heard-Bey 
1999:134). Six of the remaining seven emirates agreed on a provisional constitution 
on 2 December 1971, while the last emirate, Ras al-Khaimah joined the federation 
in February 1972. 
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2.2.2 The Constitution and the Federal Institutions 
The Constitution that came into effect 2 December 1971, was only meant to be a 
provisional constitution for the first five years, but was not replaced by a permanent 
one until 1996. This reflects the political reality of the time. The hope was that 
within a five-year period the federation would become a political entity “well on its 
way to becoming a centralised state” (Heard-Bey 1999:135). The emirates, 
however, were not ready to give up their identity and the rulers, their authority. 
 
Each individual emirate has its judicial and political power unless otherwise is 
provided by the Constitution or by agreements provided by the Federal 
Government. However, the Federal Government maintains jurisdiction in areas 
such as foreign affairs, defence and the armed forces, health, education, postal and 
telegraphs services and electricity services (article 120). The individual emirates are 
responsible for “developments in civil aviation, oil, internal security, finance and 
investment, and economic policy”.14 On the federal level we can identify the 
following Union authorities (article 45): The Supreme Council of the Union, The 
President of the Union and his deputy, The Council of Ministers of the Union, The 
Federal National Council and The Judiciary of the Union. On the local level each 
emirate has its own governmental structure. 
 
The Supreme Council is the highest federal authority and is made up by the rulers 
from the seven emirates. It is headed by the president of the UAE. Article 47 of the 
Federal Constitution states that the Supreme Council has the power to decide the 
general policy of the federation, keep control over the affairs of the Union and 
ratify treaties and international agreements. The Council shall further elect the 
President and the Vice President of the UAE (both for a five-year term), and 
approve the appointment of the Council of Ministers. 
 
 
                                              
14 The Economist Intelligence Unit: UAE Country Profile 2000. 
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The President of the Union shall preside the Supreme Council and direct its 
discussions (Article 54, paragraph 1), terminate its sessions, sign Union laws and 
supervise the implementation of Union laws. In addition, it shall appoint the Prime 
Minister, appoint the diplomatic representatives of the Union, represent the Union 
and exercise the right of pardon and commutation of sentences (Article 54).    
 
The Council of Ministers is the executive authority of the Union. It is headed by the 
Prime Minister. Each emirate has at least one minister. Article 60 of the Federal 
Constitution defines the responsibilities of the Council: The Council has the power 
to implement the general policy of Supreme Council, initiate drafts of federal laws 
and the draw up of the general budget of the Union. 
 
The Federal National Council is the national legislature. It has 40 members, divided 
on the individual emirates. The members shall represent the country as a whole and 
not their individual emirate (Article 77). The Council has only a consultative role, 
but reviews draft federal laws before they are submitted to the President and the 
Supreme Council. 
 
The Judiciary of the Union is dealt with in the articles 94-109 in the Federal 
Constitution. The Supreme Court is the constitutional court, and consists of a 
president and a number of judges, no more than five. The Supreme Court has 
jurisdiction in matters concerning the relationship between the emirates, and 
between the emirates and the Union Government (Article 99). The federal law will 
of course prevail, whenever there is a conflict between local and federal law. 
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2.2.3 Dynastic Monarchies 
Political organisation in the UAE is built along tribal and family lines, as we have 
seen above. Iliya Harik (1990:4-17) has presented a typology of the traditional Arab 
states, according to the basis of their authority. The UAE falls into the group of 
traditional secular systems: “the chieftain principle was paramount and the 
ascendancy of the ruling dynasty has been on the increase continuously to the 
present. Nowhere did religious power manifest itself, nor was it associated with the 
ruler” (Ibid 1990:12).15 The ruling families have become the government in the 
modern bureaucratic structure of the UAE, i.e. a dynastic monarchy (Herb 1999). 
As a result, tribal and family lines have become more formalised. The Sheikh’s 
family members therefore hold the most important posts in the regime. The 
President of the UAE is the ruler (sheikh) in Abu Dhabi; the Prime Minister is the 
ruler in Dubai, while 9 out of the 24 federal ministers are members of the seven 
ruling families.  
 
The dynastic monarchies choose from among their family members, the king who 
is the most qualified. Before a sheikh dies he will recommend one of his sons or 
another member of the family, which he finds most suitable. The quality of 
leadership is being valued before primogeniture. The family therefore has the 
power to remove a ruler and replace him with another member of the family, if he 
does not adopt policies that are in the interests of the family.  
 
The originally tribal tradition of consultation is still strong in the UAE. “The 
Sheikh of a tribe leads by virtue of his personal qualities as recognised by a council 
of elders – the heads of the main families” (Hudson 1977:89). This council of 
elders is called ‘the majlis’. Yet the majlis is also defined as a ‘sitting room’, and 
the place where the head of the family receives his male guests. In a tribal context, 
the members of a tribe could visit the Sheikh’s majlis and discuss whatever matter 
                                              
15 For a discussion on the political culture and the role of Islam in the UAE, see Birgitte Bye Thorleifsson’s thesis: 
“Political Stability and Changes After the Gulf Crisis (1990-91) in the United Arab Emirates” (1993). 
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he desired. In theory, tribal politics had significant elements of democracy (Hudson 
1977:90). The majlis is still very much in use today. However, the modern 
bureaucratic structure of the state has made it easier for the population to contact 
state offices, than to arrange meetings with the sheikhs. The traditional basis of 
authority has been weakened, but it has certainly not disappeared. 
 
2.2.4 Political Opposition  
There are no legal channels where political opposition could be expressed in the 
UAE. Political parties are forbidden, and civil society is non-existent. The costs of 
expressing one’s dissatisfaction with the rulers can therefore be very high. In 
addition, there are no elections in the UAE, neither on the emirate level nor on the 
federal level. The sheikh’s majlis is, however, still used as a consultation forum, 
especially in the smaller emirates.   
 
There are no signs of an organised domestic political opposition in the United Arab 
Emirates, and there has been no sign of opposition groups during the 30 years of its 
existence. Rivalry only exists, if anywhere, within or between the ruling families. In 
June 1987 an attempted coup took place in Sharjah. Sheikh Abd al-Aziz, a brother 
of the ruler, Sheikh Sultan bin Muhammad al-Qasimi, issued a statement in the 
absence of Sheikh Sultan. The statement announced the ruler’s resignation, due to 
economic mismanagement. However, Dubai intervened and brought the matter up 
in the Supreme Council, which supported Sheikh Sultan’s claim to be the legitimate 
ruler of the Emirate of Sharjah. This incident is the only one of its kind in the 
history of the UAE.  
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2.2.5  UAE Citizenship  
The UAE population was estimated to be 3,108,000 in the year 2000.16 Although 
the entire population is estimated to be around three million, the number of 
nationals is approximately 600,000. As it is only, with few exceptions, locals that 
obtain citizenship, citizenship becomes a privilege with major economic benefits 
connected to it. 
 
The question concerning citizenship arose with the oil era. It was largely of western 
origin and loosely connected to the idea of the nation-state. On the Arabian 
Peninsula, loyalty to the tribe and the family has been far more important than 
residence on a territory. Shortly after obtaining independence, the UAE formally 
restricted the possibility of obtaining citizenship.17 Article 4A1 in the Nationality 
Law states that: “Any person who has preserved its normal residence-ship in the 
State since 1925 is to be registered in the register of Nationality according to a 
statistical declaration of such a person’s family. The children of such persons, and 
children of their male children resident in the state since birth shall also be 
registered.” 
 
The UAE, however, granted (especially) non-local Arabs citizenship during the 
first years of independence, to enlarge the size of the country’s legal citizenship 
body. Abu Dhabi, in particular, wanted to enhance its political weight against the 
other smaller emirates (Kapiszewski 2001:51). Some respected businessmen have 
also obtained a UAE citizenship. The political rights of the naturalised citizens 
have, however, been restricted. 
                                              
16 The figures differ a lot. The UAE population is estimated to be everything from 2,407,460 (CIA World Factbook: 
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook, 10.12.01, July 2001 Estimated) to 3,108,000 (Ministry of Planning, 2000). 
I use the figures from the Ministry of Planning because I use other figures concerning the UAE population that are 
comparable with this estimate. 
 
17 Cabinet’s Decision No.2 of 1972, On Issuing the Executive Regulation for the law of Nationality and Passports. 
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2.3 Concluding Remarks 
The United Arab Emirates has witnessed no major changes in their political 
institutions during the years of its existence. There has been some tension at the 
federal level, but not of such a kind that the organisation of political power has 
changed. Sheikh Zayed, the ruler of Abu Dhabi, has been president of the United 
Arab Emirates since the foundation of the federation in 1971, while the ruler of 
Dubai has been the Prime Minister.18 The Federal Constitution of the UAE was 
only a temporary constitution until 1996, when it became permanent.  
 
The traditional tribal structure has influenced the organisation of the modern state 
of the UAE. Amongst the federal political institutions of the UAE, it is only the 
seven rulers in the Supreme Council that have the right to make decisions regarding 
the federation. Hence, a modern form of the ‘majlis’. This reflects the close ties 
between the ruling families and the state.  
 
All locals are members of a tribe, but with the modern state came also citizenship. 
A sheikh is the leader of a tribe, and even though there are many sheikhs in the 
UAE, the sheikh that rules, is now a sheikh over residents on a territory, and not 
only a tribal group. Sheikh Zayed is now the leader of all UAE citizens. Although 
there still is differences in family and tribal status, the UAE citizens have become a 
privileged group, an elite of 600,000 of a total population of approximately 
3,000,000. The non-nationals do not possess the same rights as the nationals. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
18 When Sheikh Rashid died in 1990, his son, Sheikh Maktoum became the new ruler of Dubai, and accordingly the new 
prime minister of the UAE. 
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3 An Economic Approach 
 
The Persian Gulf countries produced nearly 28% of the world’s oil in the year 
2000, and holds 65% of the world’s proven oil reserves and 34% of the world gas 
reserves.19 The United Arab Emirates alone holds almost 10% of the world’s oil 
proven oil reserves and has the fourth largest proven world gas reserves. The UAE 
is the third biggest economy in the Arab world, after Saudi Arabia and Egypt, with 
a GDP estimated at US$ 60,7 billion in 2000. In terms of per capita income, the 
UAE ranked second with US$ 19,500, after Qatar with US$ 28,300.20 
 
Several academics have during the last two decades taken an interest in these oil-
rich countries of the Gulf. In this chapter the theoretical framework will be 
presented. Initially, I will present the economic characteristics of the rentier model, 
and the political implications of such an economy. Secondly, three hypotheses will 
be deduced from the rentier theory, which lays the basis for the analyses in chapters 
5, 6 and 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
19 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html 20.11.01. 
 
20 http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/News.asp?ArticleID=24867 21.08.01. 
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3.1 The Rentier Model 
The rentier approach attributes the political stability of the Gulf states to the 
political economy created by oil revenues. During the 1970s and 1980s, it was 
difficult to fit these states into any theoretical framework that was designed to study 
the newly independent states in the Third World. The one obvious factor that 
distinguished the Gulf states from most other developing countries, was the 
discovery of oil. These factors led a group of intellectuals to advance the concept of 
the rentier state. 
 
The rentier model is not a new phenomenon, but has gained renewed interest with 
the oil-producing states in the Gulf. The term “oil-producing” is, however, quite 
misleading. Oil is a natural resource and not a commodity that is produced. It is the 
enormous oil revenues, and the dependence on the export of one commodity that 
makes the rentier economy of these countries so different from other economies.  
 
3.1.1 The Term ‘ Rent’ and ‘Rentier’ 
Adam Smith (1979:249) distinguished between rent and other sources of income: 
profit and wages. “Rent, it is to be observed, therefore, enters into the composition 
of the price commodities in a different way from wages and profit. High or low 
wages and profit are the causes of high and low price; high or low rent is the effect 
of it”. Rent was usually used when referring to the natural resources of the 
landlords. This was not considered to be a direct income, but a reward for the 
landlord’s ownership. Today, the word rent is often used to describe oil wealth in 
oil-producing countries. The term rent is viewed as an income that is a ‘gift of 
nature’.  
 
A ‘rentier’ is the individual, social group or state that owns the natural resources. 
The rentier is rarley active in the production, but is entitled to receive a fair share of 
the income. The share that the rentier receives from the production is often referred 
to as “easy money”, and not earned “the hard way”.  
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3.1.2 A  Rentier Economy 
In his article, “The Rentier State in the Arab World” Beblawi (1990:87-88) lists 
certain characteristics of a rentier economy. First of all, there is no such thing as a 
pure rentier economy. All economies have a certain degree of rent, but only 
economies where rent situations predominate are considered to be rentier 
economies. A second point, which Beblawi emphasises, is that a rentier economy is 
an economy with a substantial degree of external rent. The external rent is in fact 
crucial to a rentier economy. It can sustain the economy without a strong domestic 
productive sector. An economy with a pure internal rent on the other hand, is 
dependent on a productive sector, and hence is nothing else than a situation of 
payment transfers in a domestic productive economy. An economy where the 
natural resource is not exported may or may not be called rentier, but it does not 
appear to differ from any other economy where the income depends on domestic 
resources (Luciani 1990:71). A last characteristic of a rentier economy, is that few 
are involved in the generation of the rent (wealth), while the majority is only 
involved in the distribution or utilisation of it. The creation of wealth is thus centred 
round a small fraction of society, which makes a distinctive difference between a 
rentier economy and a production economy where most of the population 
contribute to the creation of wealth. 
 
3.1.3 A Rentier State 
In a rentier state, it is the government that is the recipient of the external rent in the 
economy. It is important to remember, when using the concept of the rentier state, 
that it is based on the assumption that a rentier economy creates a specific 
mentality, a rentier mentality. A rentier economy creates a special situation, 
different from other economic behaviour based on work-reward causation. Reward 
in a rentier economy is related to chance and situation, rather than a reward due to a 
long and organised production circuit (Beblawi 1987:52). The citizens are hardly 
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expected to do anything productive, except to rely on the government to allocate 
the revenues. The result is a type of paternalistic social setting in an extensive 
welfare state, with an enormous dependence on foreign labour. Furthermore, a 
political hierarchy comes into effect, and becomes perfectly legitimate over time 
(Abdulla 2000:12). 
 
The expression “oil rentier state” is used to emphasise the rather strong connection 
between the economy and the state. The state’s primary income comes from the oil 
sector, rather than traditional sources of revenue, such as productive activities, trade 
and taxation. During the 1980s more than 90% of the Gulf states’ total revenues 
came from oil, mostly in the form of royalties and with international oil companies 
leasing agreements (Abdulla 2000:12). 
 
A rentier state is built up with different layers of rentiers. The ruler and his family is 
at the top of the hierarchy, while foreign labour is at the bottom. In the middle, the 
national citizens enjoy their exclusive right to a citizenship, though the hierarchy 
also exists within the national community. The economic system has always had an 
effect on authority norms in the Arab world. Power, control and wealth have been 
on few hands. Every area has a leading family or families, with clientele that 
depend on these families for employment, loans, different advice and so on. The 
families’ influence is primarily a product of economic power (Hudson 1977:100-1).  
 
3.1.4 Allocation vs. Production States 
It is the government that controls the external rent in a rentier state, as described 
above. This not only gives the government economic power, but also political 
power, which means that the government plays an important part in distributing the 
wealth to the population. Giacomo Luciani (1990) emphasises the importance of 
the economic foundations of state structures in shaping the basic parameters of 
Arab politics. He stresses that “the nature of the sources of income of the state 
influences the basic rules of political life in each individual country” (Luciani 
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1990:65). Luciani distinguishes between what he calls allocation states and 
production states. The former is a state where rentier income predominates. The 
state will have the role of allocating income received from external sources. All 
states have an allocation function, and most states have this as its goal, however, 
few have the resources to go through with it. In a production state, on the other 
hand, most of the population derives its income from sources other than the state 
itself. The state has to rely on taxes, and economic growth is the main goal of the 
economic policy. The economic policy, however, is not neutral. A production state 
will in this way experience a polarisation of the society, creating different interest 
groups, which struggle for influence on the economic policy. The political 
implications of tax levying will depend on the nature of tax itself, but the taxes 
must be acepted by a large part of the population. This creates a link between the 
ability to raise taxes and the legitimacy of the ruling elite (Luciani 1990:71-75). 
 
3.1.5 “No Representation Without Taxation” 
Luciani modifies his above-mentioned link between paying taxes and legitimacy. 
He states that a direct link between the two might not exist, but as soon as a state 
starts collecting taxes, questions concerning the legitimacy of the ruling elite are 
bound to occur. The well-known saying from the American War of Independence, 
“no taxation without representation” has in this way become the core of the rentier 
state theory. The people of the American colonies refused to pay tax to England, 
since they had no influence on the political processes. In the oil producing countries 
of the Gulf, the same expression can be used by turning it the other way around; 
“no representation without taxation” (Noreng 1997:253). In a rentier state or an 
allocation state, as Luciani labels it, the people do not have to pay taxes, but in 
return they do not have the privilege of using their voices to influence the political 
leadership. Oil money has enabled the traditional tribal elites of these countries to 
secure the economic welfare of the citizens without the introduction of income tax 
and, as a consequence, maintain their rule (Ayubi 1995:239). 
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3.1.6 The Social Contract 
Oil revenues have provided a substitute for democracy in the oil exporting 
countries of the Middle East (Noreng 1997:253). The discovery of oil gave the 
rulers direct access to external revenues. Where these revenues earlier had to come 
from the population, through the merchants, who in turn exacted a political price, 
the rulers now received revenues independently. This independence from social 
groups in the society is almost uniquely connected to oil. Almost any other export 
involves accommodation between the rulers and the elite who control the workforce 
and extract surplus revenues. “The merchants subsidised the rulers, while in return 
the rulers protected the merchants’ trade” (Herb 1999:57). In the oil-exporting 
countries, the elites that rulers depend on are not locals, but rather multinational 
companies. This freed the rulers from their historical, economically-based 
dependence on merchants (Crystal 1990:6-7). It is claimed that the rulers bought off 
the merchants, by favouring them in the state’s distributive policy. They gave up 
political power in exchange for economic privileges. This arrangement has been 
called the social contract; as long as the rulers “stick” to their part of the deal, i.e. 
continue to offer economic welfare to their citizens, it is assumed that the citizens 
will continue to offer political support to the rulers. 
 
                                                                Economic welfare 
 
                                                  Political loyalty 
    The rulers     The ruled 
 
According to the rentier theory, this ability of the rulers to buy off any political 
opposition that might arise is the main obstacle to the rise of democratic 
institutions.  
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3.2 Approaching the Problem 
In this thesis I intend to use the rentier theory to illustrate how the rulers use the oil 
economy as an instrument in securing political stability in the United Arab 
Emirates. To be able to analyse the impact of oil on the political stability of the 
country, I wish to examine the social contract between the rulers and the ruled. 
Since there has been no serious political opposition in the history of the United 
Arab Emirates (Herb 1999:178; Foley 1999:1), I assume, according to the rentier 
theory, that the citizens’ economic welfare has not been worsened. On the other 
hand, since a rentier economy relies predominantly on rent, a drop in the oil 
revenues will lead to a drop in government revenues and have economic 
consequences for the citizens. Therefore, one can expect the rise of a political 
opposition if government revenues are low, given that this will have a direct effect 
on the economic welfare of the citizens.  
 
The following must be considered when analysing the rentier model in the case of 
the UAE. The UAE is, compared to the other Gulf states, unique in especially one 
way. It is the only state in the Middle East with a federal structure. The political 
stability, I argue, cannot be understood without analysing the rentier theory on two 
levels; the state-citizen level and the federal level. On the state-citizen level I refer 
to the relationship between the citizens and the ruling family (ies). On the federal 
level I refer to the relationship between the individual emirates, and I argue that the 
ruler is the ruling family in Abu Dhabi, and the ruled are the ruling families in 
Sharjah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah. Dubai is a special 
case, and will be dealt with in chapter 7. My assumption is that there exists no 
organised domestic political opposition on the state-citizen level, but that there is 
some tension on the federal level. To approach the problem, I will initially deduce 
two hypotheses on the state-citizen level, and secondly deduce the hypothesis 
concerning the federal level.  
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3.2.1 Hypothesis 1 
The internal stability of the Gulf monarchies has been remarkable given the high 
level of regional conflict and the instability of other countries in the region (Byman 
and Green 1999:1). Adherents of the rentier theory attribute this stability to the 
political economy created by oil rent. Oil rent gives the rulers the opportunity to 
avoid an introduction of income tax, while at the same time ensure the economic 
welfare of the citizens. “The conventional role of the state as provider of public 
goods through coercion – mainly taxation – is now blurred in the Arab oil states by 
its role as a provider of private favours through the ruler’s benevolence” (Beblawi 
1990:89). Free education, health services, national and social security, heavy 
subsidies on water and electricity, and almost guaranteed employment in the state 
bureaucracy are offered to nationals, and no formal obligation is demanded in 
return, not even income tax. The social rights are, however, to take precedence over 
the citizens’ political rights (Longva 2000:183).  
 
Despite the fact that oil revenues have fluctuated, the government continues to 
subsidise welfare goods. The government is not willing to take the risk of 
decreasing government expenditure, in times of low oil prices. My initial 
hypothesis concerns state expenditure on welfare goods towards the citizens of the 
UAE: 
 
The United Arab Emirates is a rentier state, if we can show that the government 
allocates invested income to cover the state’s expenditure, and secure the welfare 
of its citizens, instead of demanding income tax or reducing subsidies on important 
welfare goods. 
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3.2.2 Hypothesis 2 
“The juxtaposition within Arab oil states of a rentier economy and a productive 
economy is paralleled by the coexistence of two social communities: nationals and 
expatriates. Expatriates are called upon to help fill the gap in available manpower in 
oil states. More often than not, these expatriates assume productive activities to 
satisfy the growing needs of the society” (Beblawi 1990:95).  
  
Non-nationals constitute the majority of the UAE population, and they dominate all 
sectors of the economy. They are, however, not ruled in the sense that UAE citizens 
are, because they do not obtain a UAE citizenship and the social rights that follow 
such a citizenship. The access to foreign labour provides the UAE citizens with 
highly advantageous labour markets, in the sense that expatriates fill the gaps, 
wherever nationals are unqualified or unwilling to work. This has resulted in a 
rentier mentality among the citizens, i.e. an assumption that economic behaviour is 
not based on the usual work-reward causation, as in a production economy. The 
nationals feel payment as a rightful share of the wealth, and not tied to job 
performance. Thus, there is no need to take on the work that can be performed by 
non-nationals. The second hypothesis in this thesis concerns the use of foreign 
labour in the state’s welfare policy towards the UAE citizens: 
 
The UAE is a rentier state, if we can show that the government provides nationals 
with jobs, which the nationals find acceptable, and use foreign labour to fill the 
resulting gaps in the labour market. 
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3.2.3 Hypothesis 3 
“Since the creation of the UAE there have been doubts over whether its federal 
structure could withstand traditional rivalries both within and between the different 
ruling families. Abu Dhabi is the financial powerhouse within the federation and 
the smaller emirates need its economic support. Abu Dhabi has tended to push for 
closer federation to cement its position”.21 Hydrocarbon reserves, and thus 
revenues, are not equally distributed between the emirates. Wealth, political and 
economic power, and the level of economic development are therefore 
disproportionate among them.22 Abu Dhabi is the wealthiest of the seven emirates, 
and thus has the political power. The third hypothesis states that the ruling families 
do not oppose the ruling family of Abu Dhabi, because of Abu Dhabi’s 
benevolence. Abu Dhabi, on the other hand, does not demand contributions to the 
federal budget from the smaller emirates, because they wish to maintain political 
power within the federation. My third and final hypothesis concerns the social 
contract between the ruling families of the UAE: 
 
The United Arab Emirates is a rentier state, if we can show that Abu Dhabi 
subsidises the smaller emirates, instead of requiring a contribution from them to 
the federal budget. In return, the Abu Dhabi ruling family requires loyalty from the 
other ruling families. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
21 The Economist Intelligence Unit; UAE Country Profile 2000:4. 
 
22 http://www.tradeport.org/ts/countries/uae/trends.html. 19.12.01 
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4 The UAE: The Oil Dimension 
 
The rent in the UAE refers to the federation’s oil and gas revenues. Ever since oil 
was found in large quantities in the Abu Dhabi emirate in 1960, oil revenues have 
had an impact on life in the UAE. The Arab monarchies of the Gulf were relatively 
poor before the oil boom, compared to neighbouring agricultural societies. The 
poor governments could not provide the population with social services. Oil 
changed this picture. The sudden wealth of the local governments (the ruling 
families) enabled the introduction of an extensive welfare system. In addition, these 
governments became the dominant players in the economy.   
 
This chapter is divided into three main parts, though they are not mutually 
exclusive. The dominance and development of oil revenues in the UAE’s accounts 
is the focus of the first part, while the UAE economic development with its 
dependence on foreign labour is central in the second part of the chapter. The third 
part draws attention to the federal character of the United Arab Emirates, in 
addition to the role of the state in the economy. The chapter lays the empirical basis 
of the analyses in chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
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4.1 Oil Dependency 
The United Arab Emirates produces today 12,5% of the Persian Gulf’s oil supply23 
and has nearly 98 billion barrels of proven oil reserves. In addition, it has the fourth 
largest proven world gas reserves, after Russia, Iran and Qatar. This makes the 
UAE one of the wealthiest states in the world. During the 1980s, when the oil 
revenues’ share of the total revenues were above 90%, the UAE managed, in 1985, 
to reach the highest GDP per capita in the world. 
 
The oil revenues’ share of the total UAE revenues is decreasing. During the last 
twenty years they have declined from 90% to approximately 60% of the total 
revenues. The oil revenues’ share of the total revenues has not only fallen due to 
low oil prices. The UAE economy has become more diversified. Massive 
investments have pushed the non-oil sector to almost two thirds of the GDP, against 
less than 30% in the early 1970s.24 Although the UAE is moving towards a more 
diversified economy, the oil sector still represents a particularly high percentage of 
GDP, today around 30%. “It goes without saying that in such circumstances any 
disruption in oil production, distribution and/or consumption will be disastrous, not 
only for the development but also for the very survival of these countries” (Ayubi 
1995:225). 
 
In table 4.1 The Consolidated Government Finance Account is presented. This 
account includes the federal account in addition to the local governments’ account. 
The Consolidated Government Finance Account gives us an indication of the 
financial situation in the UAE. We must, though, be aware of the problems related 
to the published consolidated accounts. They are thought to underestimate the 
individual emirates’ spending.25 The accounts of the four smaller emirates (Ras al-
Khaimah, Ajman, Umm al-Quwain and Fujairah) are not even included.  
                                              
23 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/pgulf.html 20.11.01. 
 
24 http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/News.asp?ArticleID=38653. 23.01.02. 
 
25 The Economist Intelligence Unit; UAE Country Profile 2000:50. 
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Table 4.1. The UAE Consolidated Government Finance Account 
In Millions of US Dollars. 
 Total 
revenues 
Oil and gas 
revenues 
Total 
expenditure 
Surplus/ 
(Deficit) 
Oil revenue 
share % 
1981* 13,761 12,385 12,088 1,753 90% 
1986 5,557 4,864 9,506 (3,949) 87,5% 
1987 5,634 4,313 10,220 (4,586) 76,6% 
1988 5,664 4,202 9,855 (4,191) 74,2% 
1989 7,455 6,247 10,380 (2,925) 83,8% 
1990 11,244 9,707 14,563 (3,319) 86,3% 
1991 13,030 10,867 16,196 (3,166) 83,4% 
1992 12,573 10,063 14,201 (1,628) 80% 
1993 10,492 8,247 14,878 (4,386) 78,6% 
1994 10,205 7,816 14,968 (4,763) 76,6% 
1995 11,586 8,726 16,926 (5,340) 75,3% 
1996 13,956 10,081 20,110 (6,154) 72,2% 
1997 15,301 11,202 17,533 (2,232) 73,2% 
1998 11,630 6,943 19,461 (7,831) 59,7% 
1999 11,916 7,639 19,608 (7,692) 64,1% 
Source: International Energy Agency; Middle East Oil and Gas, 1995 and The UAE Central Bank 
(http://www.cbuae.gov.ae/Statistics/consGovF.html) and (http://www.cbuae.gov.ae/DynamicGrowthB.html)  
* Consolidated budget, not account. 
 
There is little transparency in the UAE budgets, and an article published in the 
MERIA Journal from 1999 estimated that 29% of the UAE’s oil revenues between 
1990-1994 did not appear in national accounts (Foley 1999). This reflects the close 
ties between the ruling family and the government. A source in one of the federal 
ministries in the UAE informed me that the revenues in Abu Dhabi, the most oil-
wealthy of the seven emirates, were divided into three. One part goes to the 
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emirate, and this is the part that is shown on the emirate’s budgets, one part goes 
directly to the ruling family, and one to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority 
(ADIA) for further investment. This explanation seems to be in accordance with the 
MERIA article. 
 
The rent in the UAE is mainly externally derived, as shown in chart 4.1. Japan is 
the UAE’s single largest customer. The UAE is exporting 60 per cent of its oil and 
80% of its gas to Japan.26 After Japan, Korea, India and Singapore are the main 
recipients of the UAE oil export.  
 
Chart 4.1. UAE Crude Oil Production and Exports 
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Source: Arthur Andersen/ Cambridge Energy Associates; World Oil Trends 2000.  
See Appendix 1.1 for specific figures. 
 
 
In 1978 the petroleum export accounted for 88% of the UAE’s total export, while in 
1999 it had fallen to 42%, as shown in chart 4.2. Liquefied natural gas (LNG), 
alone, accounts for about 5% of the total UAE export earnings. Although the 
petroleum export’s share of the total export has been halved in a period of twenty 
                                              
26 http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/News.asp?ArticleID=34468. 01.12.01. 
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years, the UAE economy must still be considered to be an economy heavily 
dependent on oil.  
 
Chart 4.2. Values of UAE Export 
Values of Export
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Source: The OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1998 and the OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet.27 
See Appendix 1.2 for specific figures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.2 The UAE Economy 
The UAE economy is indeed an oil-based economy, and therefore as ‘distorted’ as 
other one-based economies (Ayubi 1995:225). The oil revenues dominate the state 
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revenues, yet only 1-2 per cent of the labour force is involved in the generation of 
it. The majority of the population is, however, involved in the distribution and the 
utilisation of the revenues.  
 
The oil price increase at the beginning of the 1970s led to investments in industry, 
infrastructure and services, which generated a demand for labour that exceeded 
local supply (Seccombe 1988:154). It did so to such a degree, that foreign labour 
not only complemented the national workforce, but also became the primary, 
dominant workforce in all sectors of the economy (Kapiszewski 2001:4). 
 
The Gulf monarchies invested in three major fields (Winckler 2000:238). First on 
the list was the development of the infrastructure system. Roads, highways, 
airports, telecommunication networks, and governmental ministries were built, 
transforming the states from developing to developed countries. Second, the Gulf 
monarchies invested in the industrial sector, to ensure a long-term high level of per 
capita income and GDP, in a time with fluctuating oil prices. Third, substantial 
improvements were made in the area of social services, including health care and 
education, and housing facilities.  
 
To implement these ambitious development plans and investment projects, the Gulf 
monarchies imported labour from neighbouring Arab states, Asia, Europe and 
North America. The import of foreign labour was, however, only meant to be 
temporary. The Gulf authorities thought that, in due time, the national populations 
could provide the necessary knowledge to fill the expatriates’ place. However, the 
large-scale subsidies on welfare goods such as education, housing, health care and 
food, reduced the willingness of nationals taking on manual work, or taking 
unpleasant or difficult jobs (Richards and Waterbury 1996:369).  
                                                                                                                                        
27 http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/opecrev”.html 20.11.01 
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The foreign workers were, however, not just unskilled and semiskilled workers, but 
also technicians, experts and other professionals. This is a rather unique 
composition, compared to immigration flows to other countries.  
 
There exists, though, no free flow of foreign labour. A foreign worker may not 
enter the country without the authorisation of a local sponsor (Ayubi 1995:226). 
The nationals’ control with this process gives them highly advantageous labour 
markets, in addition to economic benefits. Most nationals work in the public sector, 
but they are usually involved in the private sector as well, as sponsors or joint-
owners of foreign businesses (Kapiszewski 2001:85).  
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4.3 The Federal Character 
4.3.1 The Individual Emirate Owns the Oil 
The fact that the United Arab Emirates is a federation complicates the discussion on 
the rentier theory. Even though some of the oil revenues are allocated through the 
federal budget, the natural resources are the property of the individual emirates. 
 
Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah are the only emirates that have 
proven oil and gas reserves. The UAE produced a total of 2 280 thousand b/d 
(barrels per day) in 1998. Abu Dhabi, alone, produced 2 075 thousand b/d or 91% 
of the total production. Dubai’s production is merely 10% of that of Abu Dhabi, 
with 200 thousand b/d, while Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah’s share together is only 
5 thousand b/d.  
 
92% of the federation’s gas reserves are located in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, while 
only 2% are located in Dubai. Dubai’s gas production is not even enough to cover 
domestic use. Sharjah owns 5% of the UAE’s gas reserves, which is also utilised 
domestically. Ras al-Khaimah holds the remaining 1% of the gas reserves.28 This 
reflects the financial situation in the individual emirates. In the charts below we can 
see the financial operations of the four emirates from 1993 to 1997.29  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
28 http://www.uae.gov.ae/Government/oil_gas.htm. 13.11.01. 
 
29 Ras al-Khaimah only the years 1995-1996, and without the figures from oil and gas. 
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Chart 4.3. Abu Dhabi                                
Abu Dhabi Government Financial Operations
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 Source: IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/134. 
See Appendix 1.3 for specific figures. 
 
       
Chart 4.4. Dubai 
Dubai Government Financial Operations
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Year
M
ill
 U
S 
D
ol
la
rs
Revenue Oil and gas Expenditure
 Source: IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/134. 
See Appendix 1.4 for specific figures. 
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Chart 4.5. Sharjah                                     
Sharjah Government Financial Operations
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See Appendix 1.5 for specific figures. 
 
 
Chart 4.6. Ras al-Khaimah 
Ras al Khaimah Government Financial Operations
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The problem related to the figures above, is that we can only examine the years 
1993-1997, and only the figures from these three (four) emirates. The local 
governments are not known to provide any account for their revenues and 
expenditure.30 It has been said, that the smaller emirates do not publish their 
accounts, because they are sensitive to the fact that they receive large subsidies 
from Abu Dhabi.31 The Emirate of Abu Dhabi is, however, not known to publish 
their accounts either.  
 
During my visits to the UAE, I did not manage to unearth local governments’ 
accounts. First of all, even the UAE Central Bank did not posess the smaller 
emirates’ accounts. A source in the Central Bank informed me that the accounts 
were considered to be part of the federal account. Accordingly, they do not have 
considerable revenues of their own. In addition, my questions regarding the 
individual emirates’ economies were usually not welcomed. I was told that this was 
not interesting for the UAE economic development, underlining the fact that the 
relationship between the emirates is a sensitive issue. 
 
Charts 4.3-4.6 tell us that oil dominates the economy in the case of Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai. Abu Dhabi’s hydrocarbon revenues almost equals the emirate’s total 
revenues, i.e. the emirate is practically 100% dependent on oil revenues. In Dubai 
the situation is slightly different. In 1993 the revenues from oil and gas represented 
88% of the total revenues, while in 1997 it had declined to 61%. Sharjah, on the 
other hand, is a difficult task. Hydrocarbons’ share of the emirate’s total revenues 
tends to vary significantly during these years. The hydrocarbon revenues, however, 
tend to be much lower than in the two other emirates. In addition, the federal 
contributions are not taken into account in these charts. My conclusion is therefore 
that it is impossible to tell whether oil dominates the Sharjah economy. Chart 4.6, 
concerning the Government of Ras al-Khaimah’s financial operations, does not 
                                              
30 The Economist Intelligence Unit; UAE Country Profile 2000:50. 
 
31 The Economist Intelligence Unit; UAE Country Profile 2000:50 
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include hydrocarbons. Above, we saw that Ras al-Khaimah has 1% of the proven 
gas reserves in the federation. In addition, it has 400 million barrels of proven oil 
reserves.32 We also know that Ras al-Khaimah and Sharjah together produced 5 
thousand b/d in 1998. The most obvious conclusion is that Ras al-Khaimah’s oil-
production is so small that it is not included in the government’s financial 
operations. 
 
The fact that the economy of the UAE is becoming more diversified, as we saw in 
the Consolidated Government Finance Account, seems to lie in the Dubai financial 
operations. One explanation is that Dubai has become the ‘Middle East’s Hong 
Kong’. Dubai has been a trade centre for decades, and therefore has enhanced 
opportunities to diversify its economy, compared to Abu Dhabi. Another 
explanation is that Abu Dhabi has proven oil reserves for an estimated 100 years, 
while Dubai only has proven oil reserves for about 5-10 years, though the estimates 
differ. Abu Dhabi’s oil revenues tend to become a substitute for other income, 
rather than a supplement (Noreng 1997:135).  
 
4.3.2 The Economic Role of the State 
The economic role of the state is particularly large and powerful in the United Arab 
Emirates. The local governments in Abu Dhabi and Dubai are the main recipients 
of the oil revenues. Since the ruling family practically is the government in the 
UAE, it may be more correct to say that it is the ruling families that are the 
recipients of the oil revenues. The government owns many of the major industrial 
corporations in the countries, but most important, they own the national Oil 
Company (Gause 1994:51). In Abu Dhabi, the government-owned Abu Dhabi 
National Oil Company (ADNOC) is by far the largest oil company. ADNOC’s 
share of the total UAE crude oil production is about 50%.33 In addition, the 
                                              
32 http://www.uae.gov.ae/Government/oil_gas.htm. 13.11.01. 
 
33 Energy International Agency; Middle East Oil and Gas 1995:338. 
 
 52
ADNOC group includes 17 companies, which deal with all phases of the oil and 
gas production in the emirate. The ADNOC group is controlled and supervised by 
the Supreme Petroleum Council (SPC), which is responsible for formulating the 
emirate’s petroleum policy.34 In addition to ADNOC’s 50% share of the total oil 
production, the government receives royalties from, and enters into agreements on 
leasing land, with international oil companies. The main operators in Dubai are the 
government-owned Dubai Petroleum Company, and Dubai Natural Gas Company. 
The government’s control of the national Oil Company determines its overall 
control of the entire economy (Noreng 1997:130). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
34 http://www.uae.gov.ae/Government/oil_gas.htm. 13.11.01. 
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4.4 Concluding Remarks 
The UAE economy relies predominantly on oil, though the economy has become 
more diversified during the last decade. The creation of the wealth centres round a 
small fraction of the society, while the government allocates the wealth to the UAE 
citizens.  
 
The economy of the UAE is dependent on foreign workers. The development 
projects that started with the oil boom in the beginning of the 1970s would not have 
been possible to conduct without the access to foreign labour. The non-national 
population, however, continue to dominate the economy of the UAE, despite the 
fact that many development projects are completed. 
 
The individual emirates own their natural resources. Abu Dhabi and, to a certain 
extent, Dubai are the two single emirates with a considerable amount of natural 
resources. The oil revenues are, however, distributed to the smaller emirates 
through the federal budget. 
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5 The Social Contract Between the UAE Citizens 
and the Ruling Families 
 
In the final part of this thesis, which includes chapters 5, 6 and 7, I will discuss the 
political consequences of having a rentier economy. The rentier theory predicts that 
there is a social contract between the rulers and the ruled.35 I intend to analyse the 
relationship between oil and political stability, by examining this social contract. 
The rulers offer the ruled economic welfare in exchange for political support, 
without imposing income tax. My first and second hypotheses concern the social 
contract between the rulers of the UAE and the UAE citizens, while the third 
hypothesis concerns the social contract between the ruling family in Abu Dhabi and 
the ruling families of the smaller emirates. 
 
In this chapter I will concentrate on how the rulers uses the oil economy to secure 
the economic welfare of the citizens. The following hypothesis is extracted:  
                                             
 
The United Arab Emirates is a rentier state, if we can show that the government 
allocates invested income to cover the state’s expenditure, and secure the welfare 
of its citizens, instead of demanding income tax or reducing subsidies on important 
welfare goods. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35 For a discussion of this contractual relationship from a perspective of political theory, see Rania Maktabi’s thesis: 
“The Gulf Crisis (1990-91) & the Kuwait Regime: Legitimacy and Stability in a Rentier State” (1992). 
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5.1 Fluctuating Oil Revenues 
The oil revenues have provided the rulers of the Gulf states with a unique 
opportunity. They have been able to build a welfare state, without demanding tax 
from the population. In table 4.1 (page 42) we saw that the oil revenues share of the 
total revenues were 90% in 1980, while decreasing to 80% in 1992, and below 60% 
in 1998. There should be little need to state that “oil is the mainstay of the UAE 
economy and the major driving force of economic activity”.36 Any negative 
development will have direct implications on the country’s financial situation and 
on the policy of the state.37 Hence, the economic welfare of the citizens is closely 
related to the oil prices and the state’s oil revenues. The oil prices have fluctuated 
since the beginning of the 1970s, which in return has resulted in variable oil 
revenues. 
 
The charts presented below highlight the words:  “…the rentier economy tends to 
be much more uneven over time than industrial income. This is a major economic 
problem for all oil exporting countries” (Noreng 1997:112). In January 1981 Abu 
Dhabi’s Murban was priced at 36,56 US Dollars per barrel. Six years later the price 
was less then half of the record year of 1981. During the 1990s the price reached its 
height in 1997 with 24,06 US Dollars per barrel. However, at the end of 1997, the 
prices started to fall and reached the bottom in 1999 at only 10,50 U.S Dollars per 
Barrel. In 2000 the price again passed 20 Dollars per barrel, and have been rather 
stable, despite the terrorist attack in New York and in Washington on 11 September 
2001. 
 
 
 
 
                                              
36 UAE Economy and Future Challenges. A UAE Central Bank Report 26.11.98. 
 
37 Annual Report of the UAE Central Bank 1983. 
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Chart 5.1. UAE Crude Oil Prices 
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Source: Energy Information Administration: Annual Energy Review 2000 and Energy Information 
Administration; International Energy Database, January 2001.38 See Appendix 1.7 for specific figures. 
 
Chart 5.2. UAE Crude Oil Revenue 
Oil Revenue
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Source: Arthur Andersen/Cambridge Energy Research Associates; World Oil Trends 2000. 
See Appendix 1.8 for specific figures. 
                                              
 
38 Figures from 1971-1980 is Saudi Arabian Light-34* API. Figures from 1980-2000 is Murban-41*API (UAE). The 
Murban is priced higher, due to higher API. The crude oil prices are for the available date that is closest to January 1 of 
the year.  
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The individual emirates own the oil. Some of the oil revenues are, however, 
distributed through the federal budget, though through emirate contributions, as 
shown in table 5.1. The Emirate of Abu Dhabi contributed with more than 90% of 
the total emirates’ contributions in 1998 and 1999. Dubai is the only other emirate 
that contributed to the federal budget. Since the federation does not own oil the 
federal revenues are very dependent on the benevolence of the ruling family of Abu 
Dhabi. Hence, the revenues are indirectly dependent on oil revenues. 
 
Table 5.1. Federal Government Revenue 
In Millions of US Dollars. 
 1998 1999 
Total revenue 5 346 5 562 
Emirate Contributions 3 727 3 727 
     Abu Dhabi 3 401 3 401 
     Dubai 326 326 
Ministry revenue 1 619 1 835 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit; UAE Country profile 2000. 
 
The fluctuating oil prices and oil revenues have been a problem for oil-dependent 
states like the UAE. State planning is difficult in such an environment. In chart 5.3 
below, we can see clear indications that federal revenues have the same pattern as 
the UAE’s oil revenues (chart 5.2). State expenditure is bound to be effected when 
60-90% of state revenues is derived from oil. 
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5.2 Federal Expenditure 
The federal character of the United Arab Emirates makes it rather difficult to give 
an exact calculation over the total state expenditure, especially as long as the local 
governments’ budgets are not public information. The federal budget, which is 
published, is only part of the total picture, since the individual emirates carry out 
some of the spending. The use of the federal revenues will, however, give us an 
indication, since it is the rulers of each emirate who approve the federal budget. In 
addition, the main instrument of development policy is the federal budget, which is 
essentially concerned with the implementation of infrastructure projects and 
important welfare posts such as health, education, water and electricity (Ayubi 
1995:381). In chart 5.3 the UAE Federal Accounts from 1972 until 2000 are 
presented. 
 
Chart 5.3. The UAE Federal Government Revenues and Expenditure 
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Source: IMF; Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1981, 1988, 1993, 1996 and 2000, The Economist 
Intelligence Unit; Country Profile 2000, and International Energy Agency; Middle East Oil and Gas 1995.  
* The figures from 1995 are budget, not account. 
See Appendix 1.9 for specific figures. 
 
The UAE financial policy at the end of the 1970s and in the beginning of the 1980s 
was marked with an expansion in public expenditure and a growing government 
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role in public life.39 The expansion was a result of the increasing oil revenues, and 
was aimed at important welfare needs of the population such as education, health, 
housing, electrical and water utilities, and other developing projects, like improving 
the infrastructure. From 1982, however, when oil revenues started to decline, public 
expenditure decreased as well. The development forced the UAE government to 
adopt a restrictive financial policy.40 This new policy did, however, not affect the 
population’s basic needs. The decrease in public expenditure in the following years 
had only an effect on new development projects. Fortunately, many of the welfare 
projects had been achieved in the previous period. Despite the decrease in federal 
expenditure, the expenditure exceeded federal revenue, resulting in a deficit in the 
federal accounts.  
 
At the end of the 1980s public expenditure again started to rise, with increasing oil 
revenues, and has been rather stable, though slightly increasing up until today. The 
UAE maintains an extensive cradle-to-grave welfare system for UAE nationals. All 
UAE nationals are entitled to three plots of land, one for housing, one for planting 
and one for business activities (Heard-Bey 1996). In addition, they enjoy numerous 
subsidies on water, electricity, health and education, and interest-free loans. Table 
5.2 below tells us that the welfare of the citizens has not been worsened due to low 
oil revenues. According to under-secretary of Abu Dhabi Finance Department, 
Jouan Salim, this is not likely to happen either: “Any drop in oil prices will of 
course not affect our development plan and growth in the future. We don’t have 
such a policy in the UAE”.41 Expenditure on development projects accounted for 
nearly a quarter of the GDP in 2000, one of the highest in the world.42 
Table 5.2. Federal Expenditure by Function 
In Millions of US Dollars 
                                              
39 Annual Report of the UAE Central Bank 1983. 
 
40 Annual Report of the UAE Central Bank 1984. 
 
41 Salim quoted in Gulf News; http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/News.asp?ArticleID=38653. 23.01.02. 
 
42 http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/News.asp?ArticleID=38652. 23.01.02. 
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GPS/GPO Education Health SSW HCA OCSS ES Defence Total
1972 10,9 6,2 1,6 0,5 2,1 0,2 6,8 9,1 37,4
1973 32,2 18,2 6,5 5,2 12,2 0,7 12,7 13,0 100,8
1974 40,7 30,1 14,3 10,0 23,1 4,5 26,4 20,1 169,3
1975 65,8 43,3 29,4 26,4 36,4 7,0 37,4 31,2 276,9
1976 113,8 88,8 37,5 34,0 25,5 17,8 147,6 78,1 543,2
1977 194,2 224,5 116,0 40,0 40,8 30,8 159,3 494,6 1300,2
1978 290,3 261,3 163,1 68,3 23,4 37,5 123,0 786,6 1753,5
1979 204,5 294,2 199,9 67,4 26,6 4,0 137,3 1166,8 2100,6
1980 760,0 425,2 287,4 89,9 51,8 41,1 220,6 1724,3 3600,4
1981  384,4 315,2 128,6 65,1 67,6 280,3 2089,9 3331,0
1982  408,9 388,2 131,3 68,1 74,1 378,6 1979,8 3429,0
1983 1024,8 434,8 343,2 158,5 70,6 103,8 310,8 1918,3 4364,8
1984 1088,5 415,7 263,4 162,9 50,9 108,4 218,5 2246,5 4554,9
1985 756,5 433,1 259,6 124,8 34,9 104,3 205,4 1587,3 3505,9
1986 665,8 444,8 252,8 119,9 27,8 95,9 184,4 1587,3 3378,6
1987 680,7 483,0 248,4 115,2 23,4 95,9 182,5 1587,3 3416,5
1988 663,6 512,7 250,3 114,4 15,8 96,2 158,5 1587,3 3398,8
1989 732,8 546,2 250,6 114,4 15,0 54,8 159,4 1587,3 3460,4
1990 734,7 580,8 271,3 114,4 16,3 100,5 229,1 1587,3 3634,4
1991 725,7 630,3 282,8 143,3 28,6 122,6 384,1 1587,3 3904,7
1992 710,2 678,8 285,5 143,6 40,0 133,8 345,7 1587,3 3924,8
1993 732,0 704,7 310,8 144,4 79,5 137,6 190,7 1587,3 3887,0
1994 801,4 740,4 314,6 143,6 86,9 136,5 229,6 1587,3 4040,3
1995 770,9 782,9 323,9 143,8 63,2 127,8 166,2 1587,3 3965,9
1996 828,7 857,0 338,9 147,4 41,7 90,7 177,3 1641,8 4123,4
1997 935,9 920,1 378,8 180,3 34,9 74,3 175,1 1641,1 4340,4
1998 961,5 924,7 394,8 178,1 63,7 80,9 297,1 1641,1 4541,9
Source: IMF: Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1981, 1988, 1993, 1996 and 2000. 
 
Clarifications: 
GPS/GPO: General Public Services/General Public Order  
SSW: Social Security and Welfare 
HCA: Housing and Commun. Amenities 
OCSS: Other Community and Social Services 
ES: Economic Services (Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing, Mining, Manufacturing and Construction, 
Electricity, Gas, Steam and Water, Transportation and Communication, and other economic services)  
 
 
5.2.1 Federal Expenditure on Defence 
The UAE witnessed an enormous growth in the military expenditure during the 
1970s, while stabilising from the mid 1980s. Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the 
UAE have an exceptionally high military expenditure per capita (Noreng 
1997:171). Table 5.2 shows that the military expenditure from the end of the 1970s 
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accounted for approximately 40-60% of the total welfare contributions in the 
federal budget. 80% of the UAE’s total military manpower and its defence budget, 
is provided by Abu Dhabi (Foley 1999). The UAE armed forces maintains, 
however, no more than 64 500 personnel, of whom nearly one-third are expatriates.  
 
According to the MERIA article, written by Foley (1999), the UAE provided US$ 
6.572 billion in assistance to the United States during the 1991 Gulf War.43 If we 
take a look at table 4.1 (page 42) and table 5.2, this number cannot have been 
included in the national account, or the federal budget. The figures are therefore 
expected to be much higher than shown in the budget. 
 
5.2.2 Federal Expenditure on Education  
“It is generally acknowledged in the Gulf region that the long-term prosperity of a 
nation ultimately depends upon the ability of its people to manage existing 
resources and develop new ones. Investment in education is an essential component 
of any healthy society and an essential pre-condition for positive social 
development” (Yamani 1997:275). These thoughts are also reflected in UAE 
policies. The waste majority of the UAE population were illiterate in 1971. No 
wonder that the expenditure on the education sector has steadily risen since 1972. 
The citizens of the UAE enjoy free education. Nationals were, in the beginning, 
even given financial inducement for sending their children to school (Heard-Bey 
1996:394). The government funds primary and secondary schools in both rural and 
urban areas, as well as universities in the main cities (Yamani 1997:275). In 1972 
there were 16 boys’ schools and 12 girls’ schools (Heard-Bey 1996:268). Today 
there are a total of 1060 schools. 44 The first university in the UAE, the United Arab 
Emirates University in Al Ain (in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi), was established in 
                                              
 
44 Ministry of Planning; Annual Statistical Abstract (23, 24) Issues. 1998-1999. The number contains both governmental 
and private schools. 
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1977.45 In 1996 there was a total of eight colleges, where graduates could obtain the 
same grades as university graduates (Heard-Bey 1996:401). These figures and the 
increasing expenditure on education indicate that the education sector has been a 
priority sector since it has neither been affected by the oil prices nor the federal 
government’s revenues.  
 
5.2.3 Federal Expenditure on Employment 
Although the numbers cannot be easily seen in table 5.2, most nationals are on the 
government’s payroll. Emiratis represented 41% of the labour force in the 
government bureaucracy, while only 7,8% of the manpower in the private sector in 
1998 (Kapiszewski 2001:76). The indigenous labour force has a strong preference 
for public employment. The remuneration in the bureaucracy is usually twice of 
that in the private sector (Ayubi 1995:381-382). The government has made an 
effort to provide all UAE nationals with jobs. The result has been that the state 
offices have become overcrowded. An increase in unemployment is therefore 
becoming a major issue in the Emirates, like its counterparts in the Gulf. 12.000 
nationals now enter the workforce every year.46 Although the problem is not as 
pressing as with its immediate neighbours, an emiratisation process of the UAE 
economy remains a national objective.47 From the mid 1980s, the authorities in the 
Gulf monarchies started to implement a policy of nationalising the labour force 
(Emiratisation, Bahrainisation, Saudisation, Kuwaitisation). The aim was to 
gradually reduce the dependence on foreign labour, and replace this manpower with 
local manpower. Emiratisation has especially been imposed on the banking sector. 
The government has set an annual minimum of five percent increase in 
emiratisation of this sector.48 Within the education sector, the plan is to replace 400 
                                              
45 http://www.uaeu.ac.ae/uprofile/history.html. 16.08.02. 
 
46 The Economist Intelligence Unit; UAE Country Profile, February 2001, p. 18. 
 
47 Quotas for the employment of nationals. Emiratisation is further discussed in chapter 7. 
 
48 http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/News.asp?ArticleID=29638. 18.10.01.  
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expatriate teachers with UAE nationals.49 The project is necessary, because of the 
reluctance of employing nationals. They are considered to be unproductive and cost 
more than experienced Asian counterparts.50 The problem is also that only 196,000 
of the 600,000 UAE nationals are between the age of 20 and 50. Among these, only 
25,000 have degrees and 21,000 are pursuing a higher education.51 The solution to 
the problems concerning employment is therefore not as simple as ending the 
contracts of expatriates and giving their jobs to nationals.  
 
5.2.4 Consequences of High Expenditure 
A drop in the UAE’s oil revenues has not led to a decline in the welfare of the UAE 
citizens. The government has maintained high welfare expenditure, despite 
fluctuating oil prices. Since the beginning of the 1990s there has even been a steady 
increase in state expenditure. The result is an annual deficit, both in the federal 
budget, and in the accounts of the local governments of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Not 
one time has the idea of income tax been introduced. Accordingly, the government 
has welfare as a top priority, despite the fact that public expenditure succeeds 
public revenue. 
 
5.3 Budget Deficits 
The downward trend in the oil prices began in the early 1980s, which in the UAE 
resulted in the first federal budget deficit in 1982.52 Almost without exception, the 
deficit has been annual both in the Federal Budget and in the Consolidated 
Government Finance Account. The reason why the Consolidated Government 
Finance Account shows a rather large deficit seems to lie in the Abu Dhabi 
Financial Operations, and to a certain extent Dubai’s Financial Operations. From 
                                              
49 http://www.gulf.news.com/Articles/News.asp?ArticleID=17742. 22.05.01. 
 
50 The Economist Intelligence Unit; UAE Country Profile, February 2001, p.19. 
 
51 http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/News.asp?ArticleID=21812. 10.07.01. 
52 UAE Economy and Future Challenges. A UAE Central Bank Report 26.11.98. 
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the charts 4.3-4.5 (pages 48-49) we can without difficulty see that Abu Dhabi had 
by far the highest revenues and the highest expenditure of all the emirates. Abu 
Dhabi had, however, also the highest deficits. Dubai had some deficits, while 
Sharjah had no deficits between 1993 and 1997. Sharjah, I assume, has not the 
same potential to cover the deficit as the two largest emirates, due to their rather 
small revenues, and therefore prefer to keep an annual surplus. 
 
According to the UAE Central Bank, the UAE’s overall deficit is covered by 
transfers from government-invested income.53 The forecast revenues do, however, 
not include investment returns. An explanation of this may lie in the nature of these 
investments. The annual budget deficits are covered by transfers from the Abu 
Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA).54 ADIA is a public authority, established in 
March 1976 (Heard-Bey 1996:396), that invests the oil revenues abroad, and is 
responsible for co-ordinating the emirate’s public investment policy (Ayubi 
1995:307 and 381). But ADIA is virtually owned by the ruler of Abu Dhabi. It is 
the ruling family that has a fortune abroad, and not the UAE government itself.55 
Their invested income is therefore only included in the accounts to cover up 
deficits. To draw a line between government-owned and ruler-owned companies is 
practically impossible. 
In table 5.3 the UAE government’s foreign assets are shown. The revenues that 
ADIA invests are not included in this table. Unfortunately, these figures are 
therefore extremely misleading. ADIA invests billions of US dollars but produce 
no public reports.56 One of my sources has informed me that ADIA has earned 
more money during the last couple of years than the Abu Dhabi National Oil 
Company, which produces 50% of the total UAE oil production. Can this be true? 
Doran (1997:193) states in his article on Economics and Security in the Gulf, that 
                                              
 
53 http://www.cbuae.gov.ae/Statistics/consGovF.html. 05.11.01. 
 
54 UAE Economy and Future Challenges. A UAE Central Bank Report. 26.11.98. 
 
55 Unfortunately, I don’t have any written sources concerning this fact, but several academics have confirmed it. 
56 Energy International Agency; Middle East Oil and Gas 1995:19. 
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by some reports, Kuwait is earning as much on foreign investments as from oil 
revenue itself. This may therefore also be valid for the UAE. The figures 
concerning the UAE foreign assets are, on the basis of the information above, 
bound to be higher than table 5.3 shows. 
 
Table 5.3. UAE Foreign Assets 
In Billions of US Dollars.   
1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 
0,50 2,31 0,89 2,10 3,62 
1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 
3,00 3,76 4,69 4,83 5,94 
Source: International Energy Agency; Middle East Oil and Gas 1995. 
 
”Until now, oil funds have cemented together the system of the various Gulf states 
so that, as long as funds have been sufficient to allow for almost everybody to 
benefit even after the needs of the Royal family and the ‘state’ have been met, order 
and apparent socio-political peace have been maintained” (Ayubi 1995:240). The 
UAE has resorted to earnings from its overseas funds to shore up budget deficits 
instead of borrowing or imposing income tax. As a result, the UAE’s debt has 
remained a fraction of its GDP, as we can see in table 5.4.57 
 
Table 5.4. UAE External Debt Data. 
In Millions of US Dollars. 
 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1997 
External 
Dept 
7010 10358 9140 10860 11623 10970 12215 10883 12328 
Dept % 
Of GDP 
22,9 37,4 42,2 45,8 34,5 31,4 33,3 24,4 26,6 
Sources: International Energy Agency; Middle East Oil and Gas 1995, and The Economist Intelligence Unit; 
UAE Country Profile 2000. 
 
                                              
57 http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/News.asp?ArticleID=35186. 12.12.01. 
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The situation in the UAE is in deep contrast to the situation in Saudi Arabia, which 
relies heavily on domestic borrowing to cover budget deficits, after its massive 
foreign assets were consumed by two Gulf wars. The Kingdom’s domestic debt is 
almost equivalent to its GDP.58 The differences in the UAE’s and Saudi Arabia’s 
financial situation, can further be seen in their estimated current account balances, 
as shown in table 5.5 below. The UAE has never experienced a negative balance, 
not even during the worst oil crises. The UAE is in fact the exception among the 
oil-producing Gulf states.  
 
Table 5.5. UAE`s and Saudi Arabia’s Estimated Current Account Balances 
In Millions of US Dollars. 
 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 
UAE 1,692 5,255 10,069 9,207 7,001 5,257 7,463 
KSA* -2,212 10,206 41,503 39,627 7,575 -16,852 -18,401 
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
UAE 6,946 2,370 4,086 2,533 4,549 5,230 1,634 
KSA -12,932 -11,795 -9,773 -7,340 -9,538 -4,152 -27,546 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
UAE 3,043 183 360 1,220 6,850 6,701 2,309 
KSA -17,740 -17,268 -10,487 -5,325 681 257 -11,500 
Source: The OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1998. 
* The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
5.4 Concluding Remarks 
It is not possible to see any pattern between the fluctuating oil prices and oil 
revenues, and the welfare of the UAE citizens. The decline in oil prices has not led 
to a deterioration of the welfare services. The government is willing to maintain 
public spending, and find other ways of shoring up the budget gaps, instead of 
imposing income tax or reducing subsidies on important welfare posts. The rise in 
the federal welfare expenditure after 1990 is a sign that the government is willing to 
                                                                                                                                        
 
58 http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/News.asp?ArticleID=35186. 12.12.01. 
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use invested income to cover the demands in the welfare sector. This indicates that 
the rulers avoid raising taxes, because they are afraid of the political consequences.  
 
The UAE have economic and budgetary problems. However, they are not nearly as 
bad as those of the remaining Gulf states. The UAE has large natural resources, the 
second largest economy in the Gulf, and the most developed non-oil private sector.  
 
My first hypothesis appears strengthened, even though limited empirical data 
weakens the possibility of drawing precise conclusions. The citizens have been 
loyal to the rulers of the federation, and have in this way kept their part of the social 
contract. The rulers, on the other side, have continued to offer the citizens economic 
welfare, even in times of decreasing oil revenues.  
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6 The Role of Foreign Labour 
 
In Anh Nga Longva’s PhD thesis in anthropology (1993), on migrant workers in 
Kuwait, the term ‘plural society’ is dominant, though with limitations and re-
interpretations, since the theory originally was developed by the theorist Joseph S. 
Furnival, on the European colonies in Southeast Asia. The plural society in Kuwait, 
and also, in the United Arab Emirates, can be seen as ‘a business partnership’, “for 
the sole common interests the sections share among themselves are ‘business 
interests’” (Longva 1993:4). It is the only way in which the different ethnic groups 
interact with each other. 
 
Kapiszewski (2001:5) describes the situation in the Gulf monarchies as follows: 59 
”Small populations with huge oil revenues enabled the establishment of generous 
welfare programmes for nationals as well as distinct, highly advantageous labour 
markets for them”. The advantageous labour market for nationals would, however, 
not have been possible without the availability of foreign labour. This chapter will 
focus on the UAE authorities’ policies towards nationals and the labour market:  
 
The UAE is a rentier state, if we can show that the government provides nationals 
with jobs, which the nationals find acceptable, and use foreign labour to fill the 
resulting gaps in the labour market.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
59 With the exception of Saudi Arabia, who can not be considered to have a small population. 
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6.1 The Composition of the UAE Population 
6.1.1 A Rapid Population Growth 
The UAE population has increased 35 times since 1950.60 As a result, the United 
Arab Emirates is now the second largest Gulf monarchy, in total population, and 
has the largest percentage of non-nationals, and hence the smallest national 
population in per cent of the total population. The UAE also had the highest rate of 
non-nationals increase, during the 1970s and early 1980s. In the 1990s, the annual 
growth rate of the total population was 6,3 per cent (Kapiszewski 2001:36). 
 
Chart 6.1. The UAE Population 1978-2000 
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Source: The OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1998, the UAE Central Bank (05.11.01), and the Ministry of 
Planning (07.11.01). See Appendix 1.10 for specific figures. 
 
There are several limitations on data concerning the composition of the UAE 
population. Of the seven emirates in the federation, only Abu Dhabi released 
regular statistics on migrant workers (Seccombe 1988:170) in the 1980s. In 
addition, non-nationals tend to be under-enumerated in census results (Birks 
                                              
60 The Economist 23.03.02, page 3. 
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1988:138), due to the fact that the number of illegal workers is difficult to predict. 
During my stays in the United Arab Emirates, I experienced that the relationship 
between nationals and non-nationals was a sensitive issue, due to the World Trade 
Organisation’s (WTO) and the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) policies 
towards the UAE. The tables concerning nationals vs. non-nationals, in this thesis, 
are therefore secondary data. I personally did not manage to obtain any written 
information concerning the relationship between nationals and non-nationals. 
Figures from the last (1995) census concerning this matter have been held away 
from the public, at least during the last years, when international pressure has been 
higher.61 However, despite the limitations on data, the trends of population flows 
can still be examined. 
 
In the UAE the nationals have represented a small minority since the foundation of 
the federation. The percentage nationals of the total UAE population is in fact 
continuing to decline, as we can see in table 6.1. The same is valid for the other 
Gulf states. The Gulf states are trying to solve the problems this causes, by adapting 
pro-natalist policies that enlarge the size of national populations. The pro-natalist 
policy has mainly contained interest-free housing loans, free housing for low-
income nationals, allowance for families according to children, full paid maternity 
leave, and financial assistance to nationals willing to marry local women 
(Kapiszewski 2001:43). According to the figures in table 6.1, the results have been 
rather limited. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
61 The next census will be in the year 2005, even though the aim was to have a census every five years. 
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Table 6.1. National and Non-national population of the UAE 
   Nationals 
   (1,000s) 
  Nationals 
      (%) 
Non-
nationals 
 (1,000s) 
Non-
nationals 
     (%) 
Total 
Population 
   (1,000s) 
1975 200 30,5 456 69,5 656 
1985 342 21,3 1,258 78,7 1,600 
1992 531 29,1 1,294 70,9 1,825 
1997* 658 24,4 2,038 75,6 2,696 
2002* 594 18,0 2,706 82,0 3,300 
Source: Bonine (1997); Population Growth, the Labour Market and Gulf Security, page 229, Kapiszewski 
(2001); Nationals and Expatriates. Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Co-operation Council 
States, page 37 and 39, and The Economist 23.03.02, page 11. 
* The figures are estimates. 
 
6.1.2 The Expatriate Population 
The composition of the expatriate population has changed since the beginning of 
the oil era. In 1975 the share of Arabs in the expatriate population was 26%, in 
1985 it was reduced to 19% and in 1996 it had declined to only 10% (Kapiszewski 
2001:62). The decrease is a result of various factors. First of all, the governments 
became worried that non-local Arabs would spread pan-Arab ideological ideas that 
could threaten the existence of the monarchical systems in the Gulf. Second, non-
national Arabs were often accompanied by their families, being a heavier economic 
burden than their Asian counterparts, who extracted lower pay, came alone and 
were more specialised. Third, the Gulf War may have had an effect as well. The 
Gulf countries deported Palestinians, because the Palestinian authorities supported 
Iraq. This situation was of course most pressing in Kuwait, where only 20,000 out 
of 400,000 Palestinians remained (Longva 1997:245).   
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The declining share of Arabs in the expatriate population is, however, not in 
accordance with the UAE Federal Labour Law: “Where national employees are not 
available, preference in employment shall be given to: 1- Arab workers belonging 
to an Arab country by nationality. 2 - Workers of other nationalities” (Article 10). 
 
The composition of the population has changed also due to the shift in required 
occupations. Expatriates from few countries tend to dominate different sectors in 
the economy. Traders and engineers come mainly from India, Iran and Pakistan, 
while teachers come from Egypt, Jordan, Palestine or Lebanon, housemaids from 
Sri Lanka and the Philippines, and unskilled workers from Pakistan, Bangladesh 
and Yemen. The construction era is mainly over, while the service sector has begun 
to emerge as the main non-oil contributor to the economy (Kapiszewski 2001:60-
61). 
 
In table 6.2 the composition of the non-national population in 1992 is shown. Even 
though I have some trouble believing that there were no North Americans living in 
the UAE in 1992, I assume that the figures give us an overall picture. In 1997 the 
number of Indians in the UAE population had increased to about 1 million, and the 
number of Pakistanis to around 400 000 (Kapiszewski 2001:65). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 6.2. Non-national population by nationality and state, 1992 
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Nationality Total Nationality Total Nationality Total 
Egyptian 81,800 Pakistani 231,601 North Am. 0 
Sudanese 45,900 Bangladeshi 61,100 African 8,000 
Jordanians 
/Palestinians 
151,401 Indian 355,501 Other OECD 15,000 
Lebanese 34,700 Sri Lankan 60,300 Other 9,600 
Syrian 20,800 Filipino 35,600   
Yemeni 27,200 Iranian 61,200   
Other Arab 84,200 Other 10,100   
      
Arab  
Sub-total 
446,001 Asian  
Sub-total 
815,402 Sub- total 32,600 
% Of total 
expatriate pop 
34,5 % Of total 
expatriate pop
63,0 % Of total 
expatriate pop 
2,5 
Source: Bonine (1997); Population Growth, the Labour Market and Gulf Security, page 230. 
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6.2 The Labour Market 
6.2.1 A Labour Force of Expatriates 
Although the population of non-nationals certainly is substantial it is the role of the 
foreign labour force, which is the most significant (Bonine 1997:240). “As the 
economies of the GCC countries depend primarily on oil and gas as the main source 
of state revenues, they also depend on expatriate labour” (Kapiszewski 2001:69).62 
 
Table 6.3. The National and Non-national Workforce 
   Nationals 
   (1,000s) 
 Nationals 
      (%) 
Non-
nationals 
  (1,000s) 
Non-
nationals 
     (%) 
    Total 
Workforce 
   (1,000s) 
1975 45,0 15,6 251,5 84,8 296,5 
1980 53,9 10,3 470,8 89,7 524,7 
1985 71,8 10,5 612,0 89,5 683,8 
1990 96,0 10,7 805,0 89,3 901,0 
1992 93,0 10,7 776,8 89,3 869,8 
1997 124,4 9,6 1,165,2 90,4 1289,6 
Sources: Winckler (2000); Gulf Monarchies as Rentier States: The Nationalisation Policies of the Labour 
Force, page 240, and Bonine (1997); Population Growth, the Labour Market and Gulf Security, page 241, 
and Kapiszewski (2001); Nationals and Expatriates. Population and Labour Dilemmas of the Gulf Co-
operation Council States, page 71.  
 
As we can see from tables 6.1 and 6.3, only a fraction of UAE nationals is part of 
the workforce. This exceptionally low ‘labour force participation rate’ is a result of 
several factors. Firstly, the percentage of children in the national population is 
much higher compared to the non-national population (Bonine 1997:240). More 
than 50 per cent of the local Arabs are under the age of 15 (Ibid 1997:250). In 
addition, the percentage of female nationals in the workforce is rather low, even 
though the emirates are witnessing an increase of female nationals joining the 
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workforce. Women outnumber men in the institute of higher learning, but there are 
still more illiterate women due to the fact that education became available much 
later for them. However, higher education is not equivalent to having the privilege 
of working. Today, approximately 12% of the UAE labour force are women, 
against 5,3% in 1980 (Kapiszewski 2001:103). The percentage of women in the 
labour force is, however, higher in the smaller and poorer emirates than in Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai. Furthermore, there is a smaller amount of working-age males in 
the labour force than usually found in other countries. Many nationals are in fact 
able to meet their economic commitments without employment. In addition, 
nationals enjoy a rather low retirement age. 
 
The situation is, however, changing. Some nationals are having troubles finding a 
job. In some families, they cannot afford the wife staying at home. This varies 
between the emirates. Abu Dhabi nationals are not so familiar with this problem, as 
are nationals of the smaller emirates. In Dubai, however, the change is noticeable. 
The number of nationals wanting to enter the workforce is increasing every day. 
The Economist (23.03.02) has estimated that the native workforce in all the Gulf 
countries will double by 2020. 
 
6.2.2 The Sponsorship System 
The sponsorship system or the al-Kafala (Longva 1993:73), existent in the UAE as 
well as other Gulf states, encourages the exploitation of foreign labour. All foreign 
workers must have a local sponsor or an agent, to work in the country, or to set up 
business, which results in an employer-employee relationship between nationals 
and expatriates. The foreign workers may also be required to pay part of their 
income to their sponsor. Some UAE nationals have even been known to earn 
money on supplying visas and sponsorship, without giving employment to foreign 
                                                                                                                                        
62 The Gulf Co-operation Council (GCC), which consists of the six Gulf monarchies (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, 
Qatar, the UAE and Oman).  
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workers, earning US$ 1362 (1996), only for the privilege of obtaining the necessary 
work permits (Winckler 2000:250). 
The system encourages the flow of illegal foreign labour in the country. In the 
UAE, illegal residents are estimated at 300 000 at any given time. Illegal 
immigration “has been made possible, and in fact promoted, by the interest of local 
sponsors in employing people on a sub-standard basis. Without illegal workers, 
contract costs and wages would rise significantly” (Kapiszewski 2001:92). It is a 
necessary subsidiary income for lower-paid nationals. The sponsorship system 
gives nationals the privilege of a profitable ‘economic rent’.  
 
The sponsorship system is ‘a business partnership’, a product of the existing plural 
situation (Kapiszewski 2001:198). Although it favours nationals, the expatriate 
population is also grateful to live in this country, which provides them not only 
with jobs, but a generally high standard of public services. 
 
The system is, however, threatened. The UAE is a member of both the WTO and 
the ILO. While the WTO demands a free movement of labour, the ILO is urging the 
Gulf states to accept basic international labour standards, respect for human rights 
and so on (Kapiszewski 2001:209). This is also in accordance with the Constitution 
of the UAE. Article 40 states that: “Foreigners shall enjoy, within the Union, the 
rights and freedom stipulated in international charters which are in force or in 
treaties and agreements to which the Union is party. They shall be subject to the 
corresponding obligations”. The authorities’ strict regulation of the labour market 
has, however, “left the door wide open for non-productive rent-seeking activities” 
(al-Qudsi 1998:47). 
 
6.2.3 Nationalisation of the Labour Force 
In chapter 5.2.3 I described the UAE government’s policies towards nationalisation 
of the labour force (‘emiratisation’). The explanation of such an emiratisation 
policy can be found in declining oil prices and the completion of major economic 
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construction activities. This resulted in higher unemployment rates, and 
underemployment. The high cost of foreign workers and their accompanying 
families became a factor. Politically, the challenge of having such a large foreign 
population started to worry the rulers of the Gulf. “Nationalisation policies were 
thus perceived as an essential means to secure the future of the existing regimes of 
the Gulf monarchies” (Winckler 2000:245).  
 
The UAE’s federal labour law (1980) imposed strict limitations on the mobility of 
foreign workers from one job to another. The law requires that they leave the 
country for at least six months before changing employment. Other political 
initiatives trying to reduce the number of foreign workers, have been to make their 
employment more expensive, i.e. the costs of labour cards, permits, visas and health 
cards. During the 1990s more regulations were imposed, with the quotation of 
nationals into the private sector as the key policy.  
 
During 1984-1987 there was a reduction in the number of foreign workers. In 1985 
600 out of 10,000 foreign workers in the UAE banking sector lost their jobs 
(Winckler 2000:247). The decrease was, however, short-lived. By the end of the 
1980s the number had again increased, as seen in table 6.4. 
Table 6.4. Growth of National and Foreign Labour Force in the UAE 
In percent per annum.  
 National Foreign 
1975-1980 3,8 15,0 
1980-1985 3,9 -0,5 
1985-1995 2,7 5,3 
Source: al-Qudsi, Sulayman (1998): Labour Markets and Policy in the GCC: Micro Diagnostics and Macro 
Profiles. Emirates Lecture 12, page 7. 
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6.3 Nationals vs. Non-Nationals in the UAE Welfare State 
6.3.1 The Effects of the Nationalisation Process 
According to the rentier theory, the government will provide the citizens with 
economic welfare, in exchange for political loyalty. In the 1970s and 1980s the 
economic development of the state was inevitably dependent on foreign labour. 
Although the construction era is primarily concluded, foreign labour still plays an 
important role in the UAE welfare state.  
 
Employment is an essential part of the economic well being of citizens. The UAE 
Federal Constitution states that: “Society shall esteem work as a cornerstone of its 
development. It shall endeavour to ensure that employment is available for citizens 
and to train them so that they are prepared for it” (article 20). Although Kuwait’s 
Constitution goes further in stating that: “Every Kuwaiti has the right to work and 
to choose the type of his work”,63 the UAE Federal Labour Law of 1980 states that 
“work shall be an inherent right of nationals of the United Arab Emirates” (Article 
9). The authorities in all the Gulf monarchies were in fact able to guarantee full 
employment in the public sector, due to the discovery of oil, and the large revenues 
extracted from it. For manual or more specialised work, that the citizens were either 
unwilling or unqualified to do, the government employed foreign labour. 
Citizenship in one of the Gulf monarchies became in this way a welfare ticket and 
an economic profit (Winckler 2000:237). 
 
As mentioned above, the governments became concerned over the enormous flows 
of foreign labour, and announced a nationalisation process of the workforce. The 
project not only included(s) the public sector, but also private companies (Findlow 
2000:34). The authorities’ main goal concerning employment for all UAE nationals 
                                              
63 The Constitution of the state of Kuwait 1962, quoted in Longva (1993): Kuwait and Its Migrant Workers. Exclusion 
and Dominance in a Plural Society, page 52.  
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was threatened. The implementation (emiratisation) process was and still is 
difficult. First of all, the nationals are unwilling to accept jobs that they consider to 
be socially undesirable (Winckler 2000:248). Both in the retail and service sector, 
the employers are offering nationals jobs. They find it, however, difficult to attract 
nationals, because they imagine that working in these sectors, is equivalent to 
working ‘on the floor’ in the supermarket or serving drinks and food to customers. 
These sectors proclaim that they offer jobs just like other businesses in human 
resources, IT, and sales.64 Nationals will usually only accept jobs that are 
“culturally acceptable, high in social status, typically ‘modern’ and connected with 
the white-collar environment” (Kapiszewski 2001:213).  
 
Secondly, working in the public sector is more preferable than working in the 
private sector, due to higher wages, convenient working hours and lifetime 
employment and generous retirement schemes. In fact, public employment clearly 
increases with education, resulting in a boost of young educated males in the public 
sector (al-Qudsi 1998:20-21). The wage policy in the public sector can be seen as a 
necessity to attract citizens to the management of the state’s economy. “Primarily, 
these policies were enacted and implemented as part of the social contract between 
governors and citizens in GCC countries” (al-Qudsi 1998:30). The function of the 
public sector has therefore been to redistribute oil revenues to nationals. Anh Nga 
Longva claims that by providing nationals with jobs in the government, the aim 
was not so much to employ citizens in a ‘meaningful productive activity’ as to use 
the income from the export of its natural resources for the benefit of the citizens 
(Longva 1993:63). The Director of the Abu Dhabi based Emirates Centre for 
Strategic Studies and research, Dr. Jamal Sanad al-Suwaidi, goes far in criticising 
the government’s policy towards employment in the public sector. He says that the 
government must stop using the public sector as a ‘dumping ground’. “You cannot 
continue spending millions on nationals without getting anything back from them. 
                                              
64 http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/News.asp?ArticleID=36278. 27.12.01. 
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By ensuring them jobs without skills, we are creating habits which are very bad for 
the country”.65 
 
A third obstacle is that local employers prefer foreign workers to local workers. 
Nationals often lack the working ethic considered suitable in the workforce. In 
addition, they are well protected by labour laws, unlike expatriate labour 
(Kapiszewski 2001:218). Furthermore, few nationals are skilled in technical 
occupations.  
 
The emiratisation or nationalisation process has not resulted in a decline in the 
dependence on foreign labour. The policy has neither been strictly or fully 
implemented (Kapiszewski 2001:207). It has, however, resulted in a workforce-
structure more preferable to nationals. Some theorists (Anthony H. Cordesman, 
among others) talk of the immigration flow as ‘a time bomb’. The authorities in the 
Gulf monarchies are also officially concerned with the situation, except Dubai, 
which oppose any federal intervention in the labour market (Kapiszewski 
2001:206). I argue, however, that foreign labour plays a crucial part in the 
fulfilment of the social contract between the rulers and the ruled (the nationals) in 
the UAE. 
 
6.3.2 Occupations of the National and Non-National Workforce 
To analyse what role non-nationals play in the UAE welfare state, we must review 
what kind of jobs they hold. Gulf analysts have been amazed by the types of 
occupations pursued by nationals and non-nationals (Bonine 1997:89). Foreign 
workers are usually only placed in low-status jobs. In the Gulf states, however, they 
are employed in all sectors of the economy, and in such percentages, that a great 
dependence has been created. “These employment patterns and statistics indicate 
that the GCC states are highly dependent upon foreign workers. They not only 
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constitute the vast majority of the total labour force, but also they particularly 
comprise workers for the production and service sectors of the economy” (Bonine 
1997:242). There are, however, a relatively low percentage of nationals in low-paid 
jobs. The rapid development made nationals move out of blue-collar jobs to better 
paid white-collar jobs (Kapiszewski 2001:76).  
 
Table 6.5. Occupations of the National and Non-national UAE Workforce 1992  
Occupational group  National Non-
national 
   Total  % Non-
national 
Professionals and technical 6,790 98,650 105,440 93,6 
Administrative and 
managerial 
11,720 7,770 19,490 39,9 
Clerical and related 24,830 82,340 107,170 76,8 
Sales workers 4,000 62,140 66,140 93,9 
Service workers 34,780 177,890 212,670 83,6 
Agricultural and related 3,160 60,590 63,750 95,0 
Production and labourers 7,720 287,420 295,140 97,4 
Other 0 0 0 0 
Total 93,000 776,800 869,800 89,3 
Source: Bonine (1997); Population Growth, the Labour Market and Gulf Security, page 244-245. 
 
Table 6.5 is a clear indication of the fact that non-nationals dominate all sectors of 
the UAE economy, with only one exception. In the administrative and managerial 
group non-nationals represent only 39,9% of the workforce, compared to more than 
75% in every other occupational group. In the occupational group of production 
and labourers expatriates represent as much as 97,4% of the labour force. However, 
table 6.5 also shows us the heavy need for foreign labour in the group of 
professionals and technicians. It underlines the fact that expatriates are not only 
                                                                                                                                        
65 Dr. al-Suwaidi quoted in a special report about the UAE in the Middle East Economic Digest (MEED), 
http://web.nps.navy.mil/~relooney/3040_1452.htm. 02.05.00. 
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represented in low-paid, unskilled jobs, on the contrary, they are represented in all 
jobs, not preferred or capable for UAE nationals. 
The fact that 60,1% of the labour force in the administrative and managerial group 
are nationals, needs some further comments. The educational level of the non-
national workforce was once higher than that of the nationals in the Gulf states. 
However, the enormous focus on education has led to a change in this situation 
(Bonine 1997:248). If this is the case, why is the administrative and managerial 
group, the only group with an overrepresentation of nationals? The education 
system in the UAE is claimed to discourage ‘intellectual curiosity’. “It channels 
students into aquiring prestige degrees rather than gaining marketable skills”.66 
Multinational companies blame the education system for failing to see the needs of 
the labour market. More emphasis on vocational and technical training and 
education is acquired (Winckler 2000:249). 
 
Kapiszewski (2001:212) draws attention to other sides of the issue: “…thanks to 
the specific policies of the authorities, nationals have been appointed to top 
positions in the government (especially in ministries, the military and security 
services) as well as in the economic field (especially in oil firms and banks because 
of their strategic importance). In fact, nationals are chief executive officers in 
almost all state-owned companies as well as head of companies’ branches and 
departments”. During my trips to the UAE in 2001 and 2002, I made an interesting 
observation. In the federal ministries I was always led to the head of the department 
in matter who always was a UAE national, most often from one of the northern 
emirates.67 He again passed me on to an expert on the field, often an Egyptian, with 
a guideline as to what he could give me of information. The situation is, however, 
changing with the increase in education among the nationals, especially the western 
educated nationals. 
                                              
66 The Economist, 23.03.02, page 11. 
 
67 I was later told that Abu Dhabi nationals did not need to work in the public sector. In the northern emirates, however, 
there are few jobs, and by offering the citizens employment in the public sector, the persistence of the federation is 
strengthened. 
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6.3.3 The Role of  Non-Nationals in the Social Contract 
Non-nationals play an important role in the fulfilment of the social contract 
between the rulers and the ruled (the nationals). The economic welfare of the UAE 
citizens would not have been possible to maintain without the access to foreign 
labour. The Gulf countries are unique in this way. In other countries, the working-
class would resist the importation of foreign labour, in fear of the latter taking their 
jobs. In the Gulf states, however, employing foreign workers is not strictly for 
profits, “but for achieving a higher level of utility in the economics sense” (al-
Qudsi 1998:41). The demand for foreign labour continues to rise, even though the 
major construction period is over. Al-Qudsi (1998:46) claims that: “Part of the 
reason must lie in the “consumptive” component of such demand, that is, reliance 
on foreigners to render unskilled and menial jobs that are essentially not critical for 
the economy. Importation of maids, servants, low-level clerks, receptionists and 
unskilled agricultural and informal sector workers illustrates the extent of 
dependence on ‘foreign effort’ for consumptive purposes”. I do not entirely agree 
with him. The ‘consumptive’ component is indeed high, but table 6.4 clearly shows 
us the need for foreign labour in all sectors of the economy. The main problem lies 
in the education sector, and the willingness of nationals to obtain jobs they are 
qualified for, but which are not socially desirable. Even though, the country still 
needs more labour than the local labour force is capable of providing.  
 
The imbalance is, though, exceptionally high, due to policies like early retirement. 
The public pension schemes of the Gulf countries encourage early retirement and 
dependence on foreign labour. A policy clearly inconsistent with mitigating foreign 
labour dependence (al-Qudsi 1998:41). In addition, nationals have the perception 
that wages are not related to job performance and that promotion is not related to 
accomplishment (Kapiszewski 2001:77). This has major effects on the productivity 
in the economy. In the public sector there are often three or four persons filling one 
position. As Dr. Jamal Sanad al-Suwaidi pointed at, there has to be a change in 
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government policy towards nationals in the labour market. In Dubai one can 
already observe remarkable changes. It has been said, that Sheikh Mohammed runs 
Dubai as his own firm. In this way, he supports new projects and gives the working 
people confidence. In Abu Dhabi, the authorities continue to ‘protect’ the citizens 
from hard work. 
 
There is, however, no doubt that the oil boom has created a ‘labour aristocracy’, as 
Andrezej Kapiszewski labels it. The nationals draw direct benefits from the foreign 
presence. “The richer the nationals have become, the less willing they have been to 
forsake the easy living of a landlord, a business owner or a civil service employee 
in exchange for the more demanding routines of an engineer or an industrial 
worker” (Kapiszewski 2001:77). 
 
Despite this fact, there have been few economically based conflicts between 
nationals and foreign workers. The ‘business partnership’ is in both parties interest. 
The different ethnic groups do not interact with each other, in social contexts. This 
is possible due to “the existing rigid stratification system, the legal and practical 
separation of nationals and expatriates, the favourable economic circumstances and 
a good understanding of the mutual benefits” (Kapiszewski 2001:177). 
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6.4 Concluding Remarks 
The dominant foreign labour force in the Gulf troubles several theorists (Bonine 
1997; Winckler 2000 etc.). However, non-nationals in the UAE fill an important 
function in the UAE welfare state, and as long as the working force mainly exists of 
Asian labour, and not non-national Arabs, they are not considered a threat to the 
stability of the regime. An opposition among the expatriates would only lead to 
expulsion, and thus making the conditions worse for themselves.  
 
Expatriates are necessary for the realisation of the social contract. They create a 
dependent relationship between the rulers and the ruled, and they are an important 
factor in explaining the lack of motive for an organised domestic opposition against 
the regime. Nationals are the privileged, and expatriates are separated from them by 
law. Expatriates are denied the right to obtain a UAE citizenship, hence they are 
only temporary residents and must leave the country when unemployed. In 
addition, the sponsorship system makes them dependent on a national citizen. “It is 
important to add that the rentier nature of the new state is magnified by the tribal 
origins of these states. A long tradition of buying loyalty and allegiance is now 
confirmed by an ‘etat providence’, distributing favours and benefits to its 
population” (Beblawi 1990:89).  
 
My second hypothesis occurs to be strengthened. The nationals can choose the 
work that they find acceptable. The overcrowded bureacracy is an underlining of 
this fact. Further, the dominance of UAE citizens in the administrative and 
managerial group and their much lower share in all other groups, is an indication 
that foreign labour take on the manual and unpleasant jobs.  
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7 A Social Contract Between the Emirates? 
 
The aim of this final chapter is to empirically discuss the hypothesis derived from 
the rentier state theory, concerning the relationship between the ruling families of 
the individual emirates: 
 
The United Arab Emirates is a rentier state, if we can show that Abu Dhabi 
subsidises the smaller emirates, instead of requiring a contribution from them to 
the federal budget. In return, the Abu Dhabi ruling family requires loyalty from the 
other ruling families. 
 
In this case the ruler is the ruling family in Abu Dhabi, the largest oil producer, and 
the emirate that holds the seat of the president. The ruling families in Sharjah, Umm 
al-Quwain, Ajman, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah are the ruled, and rely heavily on 
federal funds. A political opposition in this case would be a ruling family in one of 
the smaller emirates, opposing the ruling family in Abu Dhabi. The case of Dubai is 
special and will be discussed at the end of this section.  
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7.1 The Economic Differences Between the Emirates 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai are the only two emirates that have considerable amounts of 
oil, and are hence the wealthiest of the seven emirates as seen in chart 7.1, GDP by 
Emirate. Abu Dhabi contributed with 54% of the total UAE’s GDP of 46 308 
million US Dollars in 1998, while Dubai contributed with 28%. Abu Dhabi’s GDP 
is five times higher than that of Sharjah, and fifty-four times higher than Umm al-
Quwain’s GDP. Although Abu Dhabi is the most populous emirate, as shown in 
chart 7.2, GDP per capita gives a similar picture. The differences between the 
emirates would have been even more disproportionate if we compared GDP per 
national. The majority of the UAE population are expatriates, and most of them live 
in the larger cities. By the end of the year 2000 75% of the population in the 
Emirate of Abu Dhabi were expatriates.68  
 
Chart 7.1. Gross Domestic Product by Emirate 
Gross domestic product by emirate 1998
54 %
28 %
10 %
3 %
2 %
1 %
2 %
Abu Dhabi
Dubai
Sharjah
Ras al-Khaimah
Ajman
Fujairah
Umm al-Quwain
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit; UAE Country Profile 2000. 
See Appendix 1.11 for specific figures. 
 
 
                                              
68 http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/news.asp?ArticleID=42348. 26.02.02. 
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Chart 7.2. Population By Emirate 
Population By Emirate 2000
38 %
29 %
17 %
6 %
6 %
3 %
1 % Abu Dhabi
Dubai
Sharjah
Ras al-Khaimah
Ajman
Fujairah
Umm al-Quwain
Source: Ministry of Planning.69 
See Appendix 1.12 for specific figures. 
 
Abu Dhabi’s overwhelming contribution of the UAE’s total GDP is mainly due to 
the emirate’s oil revenues, though the fall in oil prices has forced the emirate to 
diversify its economy. The development of downstream industries70 is a central part 
of the UAE efforts to move away from oil exports.71 The oil revenues contribute to 
the GDP of Dubai as well. However, the emirate has diversified its economic base 
in a much larger scale than Abu Dhabi. The emirate has developed its business and 
commercial activities, including tourism, and has the busiest port in the Gulf. 
Sharjah, too, has oil and gas deposits, but it has focused on light manufacturing and 
port facilities. Sharjah is known to be the cultural and intellectual centre of the 
UAE (Heard-Bey 1996:398). Ras al-Khaimah is also an oil-producing emirate, 
though the production has been far from what was expected (Ibid 1996:398-399). 
In Fujairah, Umm al-Quwain and Ajman free zone areas and ports are the main 
industries. 
                                              
69 The United Arab Emirates, 2000 UAE in Figures, Issue 21 (July 2001). 
 
70 Refining and Petrochemical plants. 
 
71 http://www.uae.gov.ae/Government/oil_gas.htm. 13.11.01 
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The differences in the financial situation between the emirates can also be seen by 
looking at the degree of unemployment. The unemployment in Umm al-Quwain is 
the highest in the UAE, at 5.8 per cent, followed by Ras al-Khaimah, with 3,5 per 
cent.72 Although the number is four times higher than that of Abu Dhabi, the 
problem is not overwhelming in any of the emirates. The unemployment rate 
among nationals is, however, expected to rise, since the local and federal 
departments cannot absorb more labour. The number of UAE national women 
applying for work has also increased during the last decade.73 
 
In table 5.1 (page 57), Federal Government Revenue, we saw that Abu Dhabi and 
Dubai are the only two emirates that contribute to the federal budget. Although I 
have not been able to find the figures all the way back to 1971, we can be quite 
certain that the other emirates have never contributed to the federal budget. Dubai 
covers only a small part of it, while Abu Dhabi has the largest burden. As I have 
illustrated above, these two emirates are the only ones that can afford the costs of 
such a contribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
72 IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/134. 
 
73 http://www.gulf-news.com/Articles/News.asp?ArticleID=31962. 09.11.01. 
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7.2 The Political Differences Between the Emirates  
The UAE is a federation. In chapter 2 we saw that the federal government 
maintains jurisdiction in areas such as foreign affairs, defence, health, education, 
postal and telegraph services and electricity services (Article 120 of the UAE 
Constitution), while the individual emirates are responsible for their natural 
resources, finance and economic activity, and internal security.  
 
In the highest authority of the federation, the Supreme Council, all the seven rulers 
are equally represented. The Supreme Council elects the President and the Vice 
President of the federation, among its members, as shown in chapter 2.2.2. These 
important seats were initially thought to rotate on the different rulers. Abu Dhabi 
and Dubai have, however, held these seats within the federation. Sheikh Zayed of 
Abu Dhabi has been re-elected as the federation’s President six times since the 
founding of the federation in 1971, while Dubai has held the seats of the Vice-
President and the Prime Minister, the latter being appointed by the president. When 
Sheikh Rashid of Dubai died in 1990, his successor took his positions, without any 
question as to whether another emirate should hold these seats. Accordingly, the 
positions are not connected to the person, but rather to the ruling family of the 
emirate.  
 
The special position of the two emirates is also manifested in the Constitution. The 
Supreme Council demands a majority vote on procedural matters, while a majority 
of five, including Abu Dhabi and Dubai is necessary on substantial matters (Article 
49). What matters that are considered to be substantial and what matters that are 
considered to be procedural is, however, not specified in the Constitution. This 
means that Abu Dhabi and Dubai have a de facto veto in matters they choose to 
define as “substantial” to the federation.  
 
In the Federal National Council, the UAE National Assembly, all emirates are 
represented. The Constitution states that Abu Dhabi and Dubai have 8 seats, 
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Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah have 6 seats, and Ajman, Fujairah and Umm al-
Quwain have 4 seats each. The Council has, however, only a consultative role, and 
is not a legislative authority.  
 
The number of ministers in The Council of Ministers is not specified in the 
Constitution, neither is the appointment of the ministers between the emirates. 
Article 56 states that the ministers shall be chosen among the citizens of the Union 
known for their competence and experience. Today, Abu Dhabi has six ministers, 
Dubai and Sharjah three each, Fujairah and Ras al-Khaimah two each and Ajman 
and Umm al-Quwain one each. The most important posts, such as foreign affairs, 
defence, finance and industry are held by Abu Dhabi and Dubai. It is not likely that 
a competent and experienced person from Ajman would hold the post of e.g. 
foreign affairs. 
 
There is no doubt that it is the rulers or the ruling families of Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
who are “running” the federation. They have the economic means to keep the 
federation together, and they have the political power to make the substantial 
decisions efficient.  
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7.3 The Link Between Economic and Political Power  
7.3.1 Abu Dhabi and Dubai Pay the ‘Bill’ 
The question concerning why only Abu Dhabi and Dubai contribute to the federal 
posts may have various sets of answers. The first and most obvious place to look is 
in the Federal Constitution. Part eight of the United Arab Emirate’s Constitution 
(article 126-136) covers the financial affairs of the Union. Article 126 of the 
Constitution says that the general revenues of the Union shall among others consist 
of: “Contribution made by member Emirates of the Union in the Annual Budget of 
the Union in accordance with the article herein coming after” (article 126, 
paragraph 3). The article coming after, article 127, states the following: “The 
member Emirates of the Union shall contribute a specified proportion of their 
annual revenues to cover the annual general budget expenditure of the Union, in the 
manner and on the scale to be prescribed in the Budget Law.” The Constitution 
states that all emirates shall contribute to the federal budget. Accordingly, the 
emirates do not follow the Constitution in this matter. Concerning the Budget Law, 
a native speaking Arab translated the law for me, and could inform me that the 
budget law did not specify any more than the Constitution. The Budget Law can 
therefore not explain why the five northern emirates do not contribute at all. 
 
Abu Dhabi and Dubai have chosen not to use the Constitution to demand the 
smaller emirates to contribute to the federal budget. My conclusion is that the two 
emirates are afraid that they will be challenged on the political arena. The political 
risk is too high.  
 
7.3.2 The Smaller Emirates: The Case of Ras al-Khaimah 
The smaller emirates’ inferiority has been demonstrated since the first steps of the 
founding-process of the federation. At the first constituting meeting, Qatar 
proposed a draft where the number of participants was reduced from nine to five. 
The idea was to establish a union among the five smaller sheikhdoms (Sharjah, 
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Ajman, Umm al-Quwain, Ras al-Khaimah and Fujairah), with one president, who 
would represent them in the anticipated federation.74 The idea was rejected as 
unworkable, since the signing away of their sovereign rights was considered 
unacceptable. We can see that even though this proposal failed, the smaller emirates 
were at an early stage seen as less important due to the size of population and 
economic resources, or turning it around, Bahrain, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
were more developed states.  
 
Ras al-Khaimah did not join the federation on 2 December 1971. Frauke Heard-Bey 
gives three probable reasons as to why Ras al-Khaimah hesitated to join the 
federation (Heard-Bey 1996:369). Firstly, Ras al-Khaimah did not appreciate to be 
ranked as one of the smaller sheikhdoms. In the negotiation process Ras al-
Khaimah was not consulted as frequently as the four largest states. In addition, it 
did not attain the same number of delegates and voting rights. The historic role, 
which the emirate had played in the past, was not valued. The second problem was 
connected to the dispute with Iran over the two Tunb islands. Sharjah had recently 
signed an agreement with Iran concerning a third island, the Abu Musa. Ras al-
Khaimah refused to sign a similar agreement. The dispute between, now, the UAE, 
and Iran is still tense. Thirdly, an American Oil Company, Union Oil of California, 
had recently made a promising oil strike in the emirate. Ras al-Khaimah, as a 
potential oil-rich sheikhdom, hesitated to join the federation. In December 1971, the 
amount of oil was said to be too little to justify production.  
 
The last point needs some further comments. The fact that Ras al-Khaimah 
hesitated to join the federation if it struck considerable amounts of oil, is an 
indication that the sheikhdom would not accept the political conditions presented. 
Ras al-Khaimah changed its mind when it was known in December 1971 that the 
amounts of oil found were not enough to start production. With oil, the emirate 
                                              
74 The president seat was to rotate among the sheikhs. 
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would have managed to stand on its own feet. Without oil, the emirate had no 
choice but to accept the conditions presented.  
Ras al-Khaimah formally joined the federation on 10 February 1972. It was given 
six seats in the National Council, equal to Sharjah, but more than the three smaller 
emirates. In addition, Ras al-Khaimah was promised federal assistance concerning 
development projects. Furthermore, a member of the ruling family was nominated 
Deputy Foreign Minister on 6 February (Heard-Bey 1996:370). 
 
7.3.3 The Relationship Between Abu Dhabi and Dubai 
What are the similarities between Abu Dhabi and Dubai? First of all they originate 
from the same tribe. Secondly, they are the two largest emirates in the federation, 
both geographically and demographically. Thirdly, they are the only two emirates 
with considerable amounts of oil. Further on, they obtain the two most important 
seats in the federation, have veto in substantial matters, and hold the most important 
minister-posts. They are, however, not equal when it comes to the fact that Abu 
Dhabi has the most influential family in the federation. Abu Dhabi is the largest 
emirate. Abu Dhabi is an oil economy, with oil reserves for an estimated 100 years, 
while Dubai has a more diversified economy. Abu Dhabi is the capitol of the 
federation. Abu Dhabi holds the presidency and therefore the last word in matters 
concerning the federation. However, Dubai contributes to the federal budget, thus 
the emirate has political power.  
 
Dubai has had a long history of autonomy, and has always been suspicious of Abu 
Dhabi’s leadership (Foley 1999). From the beginning of the federation talks, Dubai 
was hesitant to join the federation without Qatar (Heard-Bey 1996:362). Dubai had 
a better relationship with Qatar, due to Qatar’s grants and loans, than with Abu 
Dhabi, which it just recently had settled its disputes with. Dubai’s desire for 
autonomy can be seen in the following examples: Dubai has had problems with 
recognising the UAE’s OPEC quota and has forced Abu Dhabi to under-produce to 
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stay below the OPEC limits.  In addition, Dubai rejected a memorandum in 1979 
concerning the unification of the federation’s defence forces.  
 
There has, however, been a change in the attitude during the last years. Dubai has 
experienced a 35% decline in its oil production since 1993. As a result, Dubai has 
realised that it does not have the resources to stand on its own, and has therefore 
come to accept Abu Dhabi’s role within the federation. Several factors underline 
this. First of all, the rulers of the seven emirates finally agreed upon a permanent 
constitution in 1996. The Provisional Constitution from 1971 was valid for 25 
years, even though it was only meant to last for a period of five years. The changes 
made were of a small character, but nevertheless important. The Constitution 
became permanent and Abu Dhabi was announced capitol of the UAE. Secondly, 
Dubai chose to integrate their military forces into the federation’s defence forces in 
1998. Thirdly, there have been no signs of Dubai wanting to challenge Abu Dhabi’s 
right to retain political power in the event of Sheikh Zayed’s death. 
 
There is an obvious link between economic and political power between the 
emirates. Abu Dhabi is by far the wealthiest of the seven emirates, and the smaller 
emirates need its economic support. Abu Dhabi strengthens its position by closer 
co-operation.75 This is further illustrated with Dubai’s acceptance of Abu Dhabi’s 
leadership within the federation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                              
75 The Economist Intelligence Unit; UAE Country Profile 2000. 
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7.4 Concluding Remarks 
The Constitution states that all emirates shall contribute to the federal budget. Abu 
Dhabi and Dubai are, however, the only two emirates that contribute. Abu Dhabi, 
which holds the seat of the president and is the major oil producer in the federation, 
has not put pressure on the smaller emirates to contribute to the federal budget. 
Dubai, which is the only other emirate that contributes to the federal budget, has 
been given a certain degree of political power. This has resulted in some tensions 
between the two ruling families. The same tensions cannot be found in the 
relationship between the ruling family of Abu Dhabi and the smaller emirates. This 
indicates that as long as Abu Dhabi subsidises the smaller emirates, the ruling 
families will be loyal to Abu Dhabi’s leadership.  
 
My final hypothesis, concerning the relationship between the emirates, seems 
hereby strengthened, though weak empirical data makes it difficult to draw exact 
conclusions. A social contract seems to exist between the ruling family of Abu 
Dhabi and the ruling families of the smaller emirates. There are indications that this 
social contract contributes to the political stability of the UAE. 
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8 Conclusion 
 
The focus of this thesis has been to analyse how the rulers of the United Arab 
Emirates use the oil economy as an instrument in securing political stability in the 
UAE. I have drawn attention to several ‘structural distortions’ as a consequence of 
having an oil-based economy, and how the rulers handle these problems. These 
‘structural distortions’, together with the key assertions of the rentier theory have 
made the bases of the hypotheses discussed in this thesis. 
 
The United Arab Emirates is a politically stable country, in the sense that there 
have been no major changes in the political organisation since the foundation of the 
federation in 1971. The relationship between the independent variable, oil rent, and 
the dependent variable, political stability, has been examined through the social 
contract, here identified by two intervening variables, welfare policies and political 
loyalty. The federal character of the UAE has had an effect on the research model, 
and driven me to examine the social contract on two levels, the state-citizen level 
and the federal level. Two hypotheses were extracted on the former level, while one 
hypothesis was extracted on the latter.  
 
Limited empirical data has had consequences for the analytical strategy of this 
study. In addition, the close ties between the ruling families and the government 
have made it difficult to draw precise conclusions concerning the financial situation 
of the country. The reliability problems of the information concerned have been 
discussed throughout this thesis, and have had an effect on the conclusions drawn, 
in the sense that I have not been able to verify or falsify any of my hypotheses. The 
aim of this thesis has therefore only been to make qualified assessments as to what 
could either strengthen or weaken them.  
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Since the level of political discontent has been equal to nil on the state-citizen level, 
i.e. the relationship between citizens and rulers, the focus of the analyses has been 
on the rulers’ policies towards the citizens. According to the rentier theory, political 
loyalty is economically motivated, in the sense that the rulers can buy off any 
opposition that might arise. Economic welfare is therefore thought to positively 
correlate with the level of political opposition. The economic welfare of the citizens 
is, however, closely related to oil revenues, since the UAE is heavily dependent on 
oil. The assumption that the degree of oil rent has an effect on the welfare policy of 
the state has, however, proven wrong. The rulers have continued a high level of 
government expenditure on welfare, in spite of fluctuating oil revenues. This has 
resulted in an annual deficit, both in the federal budget and in the local 
governments’ accounts in the emirates of Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Returns from 
foreign investments, made by the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, are used to 
cover these deficits. This is an indication that the rulers are willing to use the 
economy created by the oil revenues to secure political stability in the UAE. Hence, 
my initial hypothesis is strengthened. 
 
My second hypothesis, also concerning the social contract between the citizens and 
the rulers, addresses the use of foreign labour in the state’s welfare policy. The 
importation of foreign labour was absolutely necessary for the economic 
development that started as a result of the oil price increase in the beginning of the 
1970s. The rulers thought that in due time, the national population would be able to 
provide the necessary knowledge to fill the expatriates’ place. This assumption 
turned out to be wrong. This thesis has shown that the rulers’ welfare policies have 
made nationals critical in their choice of work, and that they will not take on jobs 
that they do not find acceptable. The high number of nationals in the administrative 
and managerial group, compared to all other occupational groups, is a clear 
indication of this fact. In addition, the high number of nationals in the state 
bureaucracy also supports this fact. A rentier mentality exists within the national 
community, in the sense that payment is not considered to be connected to job 
performance, but is rather conceived as a rightful share of the oil wealth. Limited 
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empirical data supports the fact that the rulers use foreign labour to secure the 
economic welfare of the citizens. 
 
My third and final hypothesis raised the rentier theory up to the federal level. The 
idea that there is a social contract between the ruling families of the federation, and 
that this contract also is a factor in explaining political stability in the UAE, is new. 
This thesis has indicated that such a contract does exist. The oil rent has made the 
ruling family of Abu Dhabi the financial powerhouse within the federation. As a 
consequence, Abu Dhabi has not demanded the smaller emirates to contribute to the 
federal budget. Dubai, however, covers a small part of the federal budget, and 
therefore has more political power than the other five emirates. This has also 
resulted in some tension between these two ruling families. There are, however, 
indications that Dubai finally is finding its place within the federation, and that it 
has accepted Abu Dhabi’s leading role. There is little doubt, based on the available 
empirical data, that Abu Dhabi’s subsidises of the other emirates is an important 
factor in explaining why the federation stays together. 
 
In addition, this thesis has revealed how the rentier theory can contribute to the 
explanation of Abu Dhabi’s dominating role within the federation. The different 
layers of rentiers stand out clearly. The ruling family of Abu Dhabi is at the top of 
the hierarchy, with the ruling family in Dubai not far behind. The ruling families of 
the smaller emirates are clearly a level below. There are levels of rentiers among 
the UAE citizens as well, based mostly on the tribal structures from before the 
founding of the federation. At the bottom of the hierarchy we find the non-
nationals, who actually are outside the contractual relationship that exists between 
the rulers and the UAE citizens.   
 
Based on the assumptions of the rentier theory, we can expect an increasing 
discontent with the regime, in the event of decreasing expenditure on welfare, an 
introduction of income tax, or increasing unemployment. Likewise, the ruling 
families of the smaller emirates will oppose and demand political power, if Abu 
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Dhabi cuts its subsidises. Despite the political consequences a change in policy 
might have, the IMF recommends a strong fiscal reform programme for the 
‘distorted economy’ of the UAE, with a reduction in government subsidies, a 
reduction of labour in the government bureaucracy, a rationalisation of non-
productive spending and an introduction of taxes on income of individuals and 
companies (Sick 1997:24). 
 
This thesis has strengthened the assumption that the rulers use the oil economy as 
an instrument in securing political stability. The basic assumptions of the rentier 
theory, in the case of the UAE, have therefore been strengthened. The thesis has, 
however, not ruled out other factors that can explain the political stability we are 
witnessing in the UAE. The fact that I have focused on the political economy of the 
UAE does not indicate that other factors are less interesting to examine. The thesis 
is a result of the choices I had to make, especially concerning methodological 
implications. It is my hope that it one day will be possible to give an in-depth 
analysis of the various factors contributing to political stability in the United Arab 
Emirates.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Throughout the whole thesis the currency referred to has been United States Dollars 
(US$). Most of the figures were originally in Arab Emirates Dirhams (AED). For 
the reader, however, the use of US$ makes it less complicated to compare the 
figures from the UAE with other figures, and at the same time be familiar with the 
numbers. I have personally converted all the figures that were in AED to US$, and 
used the official exchange rate of the particular year, found in IMF International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook 2001. The exchange rates from 1971 – 2000 are 
presented below. Further, all the figures used in the charts in this thesis are 
presented.  Totals may however not add up, due to independent rounding. 
Appendix 1.0 
Dirhams per US Dollars: 
1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 
4.3860 4.3860 4.0075 3.9805 3.9970 3.9770 3.8980 3.8380 3.7660 3.6710 
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
3.6710 3.6710 3.6710 3.6710 3.6710 3.6710 3.6710 3.6710 3.6710 3.6710 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
3.6710 3.6710 3.6710 3.6710 3.6710 3.6710 3.6725 3.6725 3.6725 3.6725 
Source: IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook 2001. 
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Appendix 1.1 
UAE Crude Oil Production and Exports (Thousand b/d) 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1991 1992 
 Export 750 1660 1700 990 1870 2140 2030 
 Production 780 1660 1700 1130 2070 2330 2210 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 
 Export 1910 2010 1970 2010 2060 2100 1920 
 Production 2110 2110 2150 2200 2240 2270 2090 
Source: Arthur Andersen/ Cambridge Energy Associates; World Oil Trends 2000. 
Appendix 1.2 
Values of UAE Export (In Million US Dollars)  
 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984
 Total Export 9832 14801 21967 21792 18224 15391 15990
 Petroleum 
Export 8661 12862 19390 18761 15956 13016 12037
 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991
 Total Export 14764 10129 12765 12250 17596 23544 24436
 Petroleum 
Export 10896 6865 7900 7627 10215 14846 14356
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
 Total Export 24756 21276 21619 24025 27569 30717 26700
 Petroleum 
Export 14251 12118 11683 12822 14980 15269 11131
Source: The OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1998 and the OPEC Revenues Fact Sheet. 
Appendix 1.3 
Abu Dhabi Government Financial Operations (In Million US Dollars) 
 Revenue Hydrocarbon 
Expenditur
e 
1993 7592 6679 11561 
1994 6957 6170 12485 
1995 8011 6955 13370 
1996 9897 8367 16985 
1997 10819 9352 13609 
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Source: IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/134. 
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Appendix 1.4 
Dubai Government Financial Operations (In Million US Dollars) 
 Revenue  Oil & gas 
Expenditur
e 
1993 2100 1854 2393 
1994 1837 1491 2129 
1995 2026 1513 2597 
1996 2158 1463 2297 
1997 2528 1542 2747 
Source: IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/134. 
Appendix 1.5 
Sharjah Government Financial Operations (In Million US Dollars) 
  Revenue Hydrocarbons
Expenditur
e 
1993 399 196 250 
1994 400 156 298 
1995 352 257 335 
1996 397 252 352 
1997 456 307 366 
Source: IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/134. 
Appendix 1.6 
Ras al-Khaimah Government Financial Operations (In Million US Dollars) 
 Revenue 
Expenditur
e 
1995 63 46 
1996 59 69 
Source Appendix 1.3 – 1.6: IMF Staff Country Report No. 98/134. 
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Appendix 1.7 
UAE Crude Oil Prices (US Dollars per Barrel) 
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 Oil Price 1,75 1,9 2,1 9,6 10,5 11,5 12,1 12,7 13,3 29,6 
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 Oil Price 36,6 35,5 34,6 29,6 29,6 28,2 15,6 17,9 13,7 19,1 
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 Oil Price 24,7 16,8 18,2 14,1 17,3 18,8 24,1 16,3 10,5 25 
Source: Energy Information Administration: Annual Energy Review 2000 and Energy Information 
Administration; International Energy Database, January 2001. 
Appendix 1.8 
UAE Crude Oil Revenue (In Million US Dollars) 
   1970   1975   1980   1985   1986   1987   1988   1989   1990 
Oil Revenue    520   6810  19390  10900   6870   7900   7630  10220  14850 
   1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999 
Oil Revenue  14360  14250  12120  11680  12820  14980  15270  11130  14310 
Source: Arthur Andersen/Cambridge Energy Research Associates; World Oil trends 2000. 
Appendix 1.9 
UAE Federal Government Revenues and Expenditure (In Million US Dollars) 
 
197
1 
197
2 
197
3 
197
4 
197
5 
197
6 
197
7 
197
8 
197
9 
198
0 
Revenues     46 105 201 444 780
153
8 
182
0 
235
3 
479
7 
Expenditure  37 97 184 289 539
130
0 
177
6 
215
9 
363
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198
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Revenues 
611
8 
438
6 
376
1 
349
4 
422
9 
349
1 
344
2 
350
6 
351
5 
415
4 
Expenditure 508 544 444 426 434 364 361 359 366 392
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199
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Revenues 
398
3 
480
9 
421
1 
441
3 
451
8 
478
7 
517
7 
524
3 
556
2 
563
1 
Expenditure 
415
4 
423
7 
419
7 
479
7 
485
8 
461
8 
491
5 
522
0 
623
8 
629
5 
Source: IMF; Government Finance Statistics Yearbook 1981, 1988, 1993, 1996 and 2000, The Economist 
Intelligence Unit; Country Profile 2000, and International Energy Agency; Middle East Oil and Gas 1995.  
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Appendix 1.10 
The UAE Population (In Thousands) 
   1978   1979   1980   1981   1982   1983   1984   1985   1986   1987   1988 
Population  790   920   1010   1100   1170   1210   1310   1380   1440   1500   1790 
1989   1990   1991   1992   1993   1994   1995   1996   1997   1998   1999   2000 
1860   1920   1980   2040   2100   2160   2310   2440   2580   2720   2938   3108 
Source: The OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1998, the UAE Central Bank (05.11.01), and the Ministry of 
Planning (07.11.01). 
Appendix 1.11 
Gross Domestic Product by Emirate 1998 (In Million US Dollars) 
 1998 
Abu Dhabi 25617 
Dubai 12912 
Sharjah 4577 
Ras al-Khaimah 1299 
Ajman 908 
Fujairah 700 
Umm al-
Quwain 296 
Total 48306 
Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit; UAE Country Profile 2000. 
Appendix 1.12 
Population by Emirate 2000 (In Thousands) 
 2000 
     Abu Dhabi 
118600
0 
Dubai 913000 
Sharjah 520000 
Ras al-Khaimah 171000 
Ajman 174000 
Fujairah 98000 
Umm al-
Quwain 46000 
 109
Total 
311000
0 
Source: Ministry of Planning. 
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Appendix 2 
The following persons were interviewed during my stay in the United Arab Emirates  
26. March – 5. May 2001and 20. April – 26. April 2002 . 
 
- Mohammed al-Murr; Political Scientist, former journalist, now a full-time author. 
 
- Ann-Christin Zayed; Former, Norwegian Business Council. 
 
- Frode Solberg; First Secretary, Deputy Head of Mission, Royal Norwegian Embassy. 
 
- Dr. Ali Saeed Al Ameri; PhD in Anthropology and Managing Director in Al Shoumoukh Int`l 
Services (Sisco). 
 
- Dr. Abdulkhaleq Abdulla; Associate Professor of Political Science at the United Arab Emirates 
University in Al Ain. He holds a PhD in Political Science from Georgetown University.  
 
- Abdul Hamid Ismail; Administration Manager, Gulf Agency Company. 
 
- Essa Abdulfattah Kazim; Director General, Dubai Financial Market. 
 
- Khalid al-Tayer; Co-Founder, Makook, Dubai. (Young UAE national). 
 
- Dr. Ali al-Ghafli; Associate Professor of Political Science at the United Arab Emirates University in 
Al Ain. 
 
- Dr. Mariam Lootah; Associate Professor in Political Science at the United Arab Emirates University 
in Al Ain. 
 
- Marcus Fredriksson, Marketing Adviser, Swedish Business Council. 
 
- Azzan Abdullah Al Ghurair; Emirates Trading Agency L.L.C, Associated Constructions & 
Investments Co. L.L.C. 
 
- Jamal Sanad al-Suwaidi; Director of the Emirates Centre of Strategic Studies and Research, Abu 
Dhabi. 
 
In addition, I conducted interviews at the following institutions; 
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- The UAE Central Bank 
 
- The Ministry of Planning 
 
- The Ministry of Finance and Industry 
 
- The Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs 
 
- A UK Law Firm 
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